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Abstract
The following thesis is an attempt to find a role for the faculty of memory in Kant’s 
account of the structures of consciousness in the Critique of Pure Reason. The very core 
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is the importance of an unchanging structure of 
consciousness to which thoughts and experiences can be attributed across time: the 
transcendental unity of apperception. If it is true, as I maintain, that Kant’s project is 
fundamentally an epistemological, rather than metaphysical one, it follows that the 
anchor of this project shall be the subject, as one who can know his world in a coherent 
fashion. Our knowledge of the world, and of ourselves as meaningfully involved therein, 
depends entirely upon our ability to self-ascribe events and experiences. This ability 
cannot be gleaned from a theoretically ‘raw’ experiential base, for there would be no 
anchor or reference point from which to begin such an epistemological project. It is the 
productive imagination which provides laws of affinity according to which it is 
structurally possible to order representations or images which are subject to the form of 
time (even a past time) in intuition, such that they can be known by the same 
consciousness as belonging to it, even as that empirical consciousness changes across 
time. This thesis attempts to demonstrate the transcendental productive memory is in fact 
a transcendental structure of memory, and that this reading of Kant is boum out through a 
subsequent analysis of the Schematism chapter, and the chapter on the Principles of 
Understanding.
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Introduction
Life, the human world, and the experiences thereof are only possible in so far as 
there is a self for whom these experiences are meaningful. The possibility of a 
meaningful relationship with the world, and hence a meaningful life, hinges upon our 
ability to know ourselves as relevantly engaged in that relationship. This engagement 
cannot come after the fact of constituted experience, but, for it to be meaningful as mine, 
must be constituted in its very structure by the role I have to play in its formation. Any 
investigation into the possibility for a human experience must therefore involve an 
account of the necessary structures of the individual for whom experience is meaningful 
as such. For, an experience of which no one is aware could hardly count as experience at 
all.
In the course of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant encounters precisely these 
considerations as he comes to give an account of the possibility of human knowledge and 
experience. I follow Henry E. Allison in maintaining that Kant's project in this text is 
fundamentally epistemological rather than metaphysical (Allison-96, xv ). For, as Kant 
writes in the preface to the first edition, regarding the deduction of the categories: "For 
the chief question is always simply this: what and how much can the understanding and 
reason know apart from all experience? not. how is the faculty of thought itself possible?" 
(CPR, Axvii). The question is of the relationship between a knowing subject and possible 
experience. The issue of the relation between subject and experience arises for Kant, in 
the Critique of Pure Reason, with the deduction of the categories because the application 
of the concepts of understanding will necessarily involve a subject for whom experience
1
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can count as such. Or, as Allison writes, the deduction of the categories is to demonstrate 
that "the categories function to make nature possible. Since by 'nature' here is meant the 
totality of appearance or objects of possible experience (natura materialiter spectata), 
this is really equivalent to demonstrating that they make experience possible" (Allison-83, 
159.). The demonstration of the forms of intuition made no such claims upon Kant's 
analysis. In other words, Kant could proceed with his account of the structures of 
possible intuition, in the transcendental aesthetic, by referencing a merely abstract subject 
because the forms of intuition, while essential, are only the prerequisites for a knowing 
subject for whom a meaningful world is possible, they are not sufficient conditions in and 
of themselves. The transcendental analytic however, with the deduction of the categories 
of the understanding, signifies a (more or less) complete account of the structures of 
possibility for a knowing experience in the world. It is thus, at this juncture, that a 
concomitant account of the possibility of an experiencing subject is necessitated.
Just as Kant takes as his point of departure in the Critique of Pure Reason the fact 
that we make synthetic a priori judgements, and sets, as his goal, the explication of how 
they are possible (CPR, B19), so too we can think of the deduction of the categories as 
the transcendental account of the possibility of human experience. So it is that, in 
attempting to give a transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding, Kant 
finds it necessary to give an account of the transcendental subject. That is, a 
demonstration of the a priori necessity of the concepts of understanding requires an 
account of the possibility of a unified subject in the service of whose experience the 
concepts are involved. It is at the juncture where Kant moves from the representations 
made possible by pure intuition, to knowledge of those representations, that the knowing 
subject must be introduced. In a system which is primarily epistemic in its project, the
2
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unity o f a transcendental subject is absolutely foundational. The possibility for the 
employment of concepts which are not derived from experience and yet are the 
constituting elements of experience, needs to be grounded in a subject, as one for whom 
any possible experience can be meaningful as such. That is, there is a need for a 
demonstration of the subject which cannot be derived from experience, for that subject is 
the very possibility of experience. This is the a priori necessity of a unified, unchanging, 
self-consciousness, or in Kant's terms, the transcendental unity of apperception. The 
general contribution of Kant’s Critique is to epistemology is to demonstrate a middle 
ground between the poles of rigid empiricism and abstract idealism, such that structures 
of consciousness can be found to have objective validity while remaining essentially 
subjective determinations.
My own contribution consists in showing that, not only is an account of the 
subject necessitated by any attempt to deduce the categories on Kant's terms, but also, 
that the structures of this transcendental subject are primarily temporal in their 
constitution and functioning. A priori structures of possibility for an empirical subject 
must involve a temporality which is ordered with a complexity beyond that of the forms 
of intuition, if the understanding is to be able to know an object, as an object of 
experience. It is the position of this paper that the transcendental imagination, or 
productive imagination, is the temporally synthesising ground which renders conscious 
experience possible. As Allison also notes: “Kant links the unity of apperception, and 
with it the categories, to time (§24). This linkage turns on the connection of both with the 
transcendental synthesis of the imagination, which is the synthesis through which space 
and time are unified and determined” (Allison-83, 159). I will draw out the importance of 
the pure, or productive, imagination in its role of grounding apperception and then
3
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attempt to show that the temporal ordering which this synthesis achieves is synonymous 
with what could be termed a transcendental structure of memory which is needed as the 
possibility for the coherence of experience.
Once the task of establishing the necessary structure of human consciousness is 
accomplished, it is incumbent upon Kant to show how such a priori structures are 
applicable to the world of appearances. The main problem for this task is that the pure 
concepts of the understanding are completely heterogeneous with objects of appearance; a 
mediating ground is required. This ground is found in time, or more specifically, the 
temporal determinations of the schemata. I shall show in what follows that, just as the 
transcendental unity of apperception relies upon a transcendental structure of memory, so 
too the temporal determinations of the schemata are determinations which, as products of 
this transcendental memory, accomplish the possibility for a past of recollection and 
retention as the necessary ground for human experience.
The final chapter of this thesis shall be dedicated to an examination of the 
Principles of Understanding as the explication of the necessary characteristics of any 
possible experience. I shall argue that we find there an elaboration of experience as 
characterised by the past, and constituted by the work of transcendental memory. Our 
knowledge of the world, and of ourselves as meaningfully involved therein depends 
entirely upon our ability to self-ascribe events and experiences. This ability cannot be 
gleaned from a theoretically ‘raw’ experiential base, for there would be no anchor or 
reference point from which to begin such an epistemological project. There is a 
significant lack of material in the secondary Kantian literature dealing with memory in 
the first Critique. It is the position of this thesis that there must be a structure of
4
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consciousness which makes the attribution of experiences to a self through time possible, 
and that this structure is none other than that of memory.
5
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Chapter One:
Transcendental Imagination and the Possibility of Memory
A Preliminary Note on Method:
A note of explanation is first required regarding the manner in which I will 
proceed here. In the tradition of Kantian analysis there exists an expository trend of 
preferring the deduction of the categories as presented in the second, or 'B', edition of the 
Critique. While there are, no doubt, ample reasons for this if the aim is to explain Kant's 
project as a whole (not least of which is the fact that Kant himself preferred it), my 
specific purposes are better served through an analysis of the deduction as presented in 
the original or 'A' edition. It is in this first edition of the Critique that we find a more 
thoroughgoing account o f the processes by which Kant arrives at the constitution of the 
transcendental subject. The detailed description of the three syntheses in ‘A’ affords 
greater insight regarding the elements which Kant deems necessary for the structure and 
functioning of a transcendental subject. Allison, in preferring the B deduction for his 
own exposition cites, as his reason, that it is in the B deduction that "the argument is 
structured in such a way as to make it evident that the central problem is the 
demonstration of a connection between the intellectual and sensible conditions of human 
knowledge" and that, while this is also the case (overall) with the 'A' deduction, "this is 
largely obscured by the way in which he presents his argument there" (Allison-83, p. 133). 
However, the way in which Kant presents his argument in the first edition is what, 
perhaps at the expense of clarity for the project as a whole, elucidates the necessary 
structures of possibility for an experiencing subject. It is precisely the details of these
7
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structures which are the concern of this paper. Allison himself, while preferring the B 
deduction overall, still agrees with my opinion regarding the significance of the 
productive synthesis of imagination: “the key move, the very locus of syntheticity in the 
B-deduction, occurs in §24 with the appeal to the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination” (Allison-96, p52). I maintain that we find a better account of the necessity 
for, and constitution of, this transcendental synthesis in the ‘A’ deduction.
I shall treat of the 'A' deduction, first, by giving a very brief overview of the 
deduction to show Kant's general purpose, then, by following it up with a more detailed 
analysis including some of the relevant scholarship in the field as represented by Allison, 
Guyer, and Miller.
Summary o f  'The Deduction o f  the Pure Concepts o f  Understanding' 
as in the First Edition pp!21-150:
When we come to the deduction of the pure concepts of understanding, the task 
that is set before Kant is to establish, not that there exist pure concepts of the 
understanding, (since their existence was proven in the metaphysical deduction,) but how 
these concepts make experience possible. In the first section of the original deduction we 
find the subjective grounds for the possibility of experience. These grounds are 
composed of three different syntheses leading to the unification/ combination of 
representations in objects that could be known by consciousness. An a priori concept that 
did not also relate to experience would be merely the empty form of a concept and not 
something through which anything could be thought. Thus, in so far as these concepts are
8
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a priori, they are not derived from experience. However, if they are to be the condition of 
possibility for a conscious experience then these concepts must not only be able to relate 
to objects, but make objects possible for us.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant established that all representations, whether 
inner or outer, are subject to the form of time, and that time is the form of inner sense. It 
is in our intuition that we find the unification of the manifold within a single 
representation. This synthesis, which unifies the manifold of intuition, Kant entitles the 
synthesis of apprehension in intuition; it is a primary condition of human knowledge. 
Without the synthesis of the myriad possible aspects of a representation, there would be 
no coherent representation to which a concept could be applied, and hence, no meaningful 
experience.
The second synthesis follows logically from the first. Having established the 
possibility for the apprehension of an object (a unified representation in intuition), it must 
be possible for this apprehension to occur multiple times for the same object. The 
question is: how could we know it as the same object? The experiential world makes 
sense to us partly because objects do not radically change form before our eyes, they 
follow certain rules in terms of their appearance to us. We must be able to reproduce to 
ourselves previously intuited objects, as well as the sequences in which these objects were 
intuited. The consistent accompaniment of certain representations with others is a rule 
inferred empirically but which is made possible by an a priori synthetic unity of 
appearances. This is termed the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and necessarily 
determines the connections between empirical representations. This includes both the 
possibility for the experience of empirical rules like causation, as well as the reproduction 
of a series of events linked only by my experience of them. Here we see the beginnings
9
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of how memory is implicated in Kant’s account of the possibilities of knowledge. I can 
link representations (or events) with each other only if I remember the representation (or 
events) in order to connect it, according to a rule, with another. The ‘re’ in both 
representations and reproductive imagination, imply a repetition which is possible only in 
virtue of memory. The reproductive imagination is that synthesis which facilitates the 
association o f ideas, sensations and memories. For example, it is the work of 
reproductive imagination which, upon smelling peanut butter cookies, reproduces a 
memory of my Grandmother’s baking. These representations are associated in my 
consciousness according to a rule of synthesis supplied by reproductive imagination. But 
we are still at the level of the empirical with reproductive imagination and must await an 
account ofproductive imagination to fully understand this implication.
The third synthesis is that of recognition in a concept. Establishing the previous 
two syntheses is useless unless we are capable of recognising a representation as the same 
as one we have encountered before. We must be able to consciously recognise our 
thought for knowledge to be possible. Otherwise we would be condemned to rethink 
every thought of an object as though it were for the first time. Further, there could be no 
combination of representations since the unity required to maintain a connection would be 
absent. There would be only successive disjointed impressions (that could not even be 
known as successive). It is consciousness that unifies the intuited, reproduced manifold 
into a concept. This consciousness is the common element to all three syntheses and its 
unity is the sine qua non of knowledge. These different synthetic representations are not 
inherently related in any way, nor can the necessary unity o f consciousness be derived 
from these syntheses, for it is presupposed by them. We are thus led to the a priori 
necessity of the transcendental unity of apperception. Empirical self-consciousness has as
10
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its content an ever changing array of phenomena, but the condition for the syntheses that 
render knowledge possible is uniform throughout any possible human experience; this is 
the role of transcendental apperception.
Having established the three subjective sources of knowledge (sense, imagination 
and recognition), Kant endeavours to give an objective deduction of the pure concepts of 
the understanding and the transcendental unity of apperception. The point of departure 
for this deduction is the point of convergence for the representations corresponding to the 
three subjective sources of knowledge: pure apperception. The syntheses of apprehension 
in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition in a concept all serve to unify 
representations, but do so fo r  a consciousness. Representations are irrelevant unless they 
can count as possible objects of consciousness; this is the only possibility for knowledge.
It is a priori necessary that there be a self identical consciousness for whom there are 
representations. Representations are possible only in so far as they occur within a 
consciousness unified in time. This principle is true a priori and is what makes possible 
the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. Only in so far as the structure of a unified 
consciousness does not alter across time can apprehension provide unified objects of 
intuition for it. If this were not the case, it would not follow necessarily that objects of 
intuition could be objects for consciousness. In other words, empirical consciousness 
changes across time, but a unified unchanging structure of consciousness is required in 
order that the intuition of objects can count, as so intuited, by the same consciousness. 
Thus, the transcendental unity of apperception is the condition of possibility for the 
synthetic unity of the manifold.
The second synthesis, that of the reproductive imagination, can be seen to rest 
upon empirical grounds since it requires something to reproduce. However, since it must
11
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be possible for representations to be related to consciousness, the synthesis of their unity 
must have a transcendental, a priori ground, beyond the empirical basis of reproduction. 
This transcendental ground is the productive imagination, which is a transcendental 
unified synthesis in so far as it concerns the a priori possibility for the combination of the 
manifold and thus renders the relation to the unity of apperception possible. While the 
reproductive imagination supplied the rule of synthesis by which I associated peanut 
butter cookies with my Grandmother’s baking, the productive imagination ensures that I 
associate this association itself, with myself. That is, the productive imagination ensures 
that, both, I do not mistakenly associate those cookies with something that has no relation 
for me (i.e. jelly-fish), and that I always associate these representations as mine. The 
reproductive imagination makes possible the association of actual representations, the 
productive imagination makes possible a consistent and meaningful association between 
representations and guarantees that I shall associate these representations as belonging to 
me. The reproduction of imagination must function according to a rule, so that one 
representation is determinately connected rather than another; Kant terms this the 
association of representations. The objective ground for the reproductive imagination's 
rules of association is the productive pure synthesis of imagination. Finally, just as in the 
previous deduction, the relation of the unity of apperception to the reproductive synthesis 
of imagination yields the understanding, so here the relation of the transcendental unity of 
apperception to the transcendental, productive imagination is pure understanding. There 
are pure modes of understanding which relate to all appearances possible for human 
experience. These pure modes are the categories and through them, as synthetic 
principles of experience, appearances are given a necessary relationship to human 
experience.
12
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Just as the understanding is the result of the unity of empirical apperception in 
relation to the synthesis of imagination (reproductive), so pure understanding is the 
relation of the unity of pure apperception to the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination (productive). We know that every appearance contains a manifold, and that 
the combinations thereof presuppose, in us, an active ability for synthesis; this synthesis 
is entitled the imagination. In order to bring the manifold of intuition into an image, the 
synthesis o f imagination must also be able to apprehend images as previously 
synthesised. Further, these representations could be possible objects of knowledge only if 
they were reproduced in a consistent and coherent fashion, that is, according to a rule. 
This rule following, or association, is thus a necessary presupposition for the possibility 
of experiential knowledge. The particulars of the synthesis of the imagination are yet in 
the realm of the subjective and empirical. The unity of association however, presupposes 
an objective ground; only thus could appearances fit coherently into the web of human 
knowledge. As Kant writes: “it is precisely because I ascribe every perception to one 
consciousness that I can say of each perception that I am conscious of it” (CPR, A122). 
The imagination, as the faculty of an a priori synthesis, is productive. Here we find the 
necessary, and not merely empirical, unity of synthesis of the manifold. The formal 
connection and unity of the representations (as their very possibility) must precede the 
actual instantiations o f them empirically. Concepts of the understanding function by 
relating the manifold to the unity of apperception, but only through imagination can 
concepts relate to sensible intuition. Thus pure imagination, conditioning all a priori 
knowledge, is a fundamental human faculty; it is the connection of the manifold of 
intuition with the necessary unity of apperception; it mediates sensibility and 
understanding. Finally:
13
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Actual experience, which is constituted by apprehension, association 
(reproduction), and finally recognition of appearances, contains in 
recognition, the last and highest of these merely empirical elements of 
experience, certain concepts which render possible the formal unity of 
experience, and therewith all objective validity (truth) of empirical 
knowledge. These grounds of recognition of the manifold, so far as they 
concern solely the form  o f  experience in general, are the categories 
(CPR, A125).
Exegesis o f  Kant's Conception o f  Experience:
Before proceeding with a detailed study of the relationship between the 
possibilities for meaningful experience and the self, it is important to distinguish what 
Kant means by experience. Early in the A deduction Kant gives a rather direct statement 
of what constitutes experience in general: "Now all experience does indeed contain, in 
addition to the intuition of the senses through which something is given, a concept of an 
object as being thereby given, that is to say, as appearing" (CPR, A93/B126). Thus, the 
intuition of the senses does not, alone, count as experience for Kant; experience requires 
concepts. We can then exclude from the analysis any intuitionist account of experience 
whereby experience is considered wholly preformed through the work of intuition, prior 
to consciousness thereof, and is only consequently recognised as such by a reflective self- 
consciousness. The motto of the introduction is reasserted: experience, which is not 
known as such, cannot count as experience. With this understanding of experience it 
follows that "The objective validity o f the categories as a priori concepts rests, therefore, 
on the fact that, so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does 
experience become possible" (CPR, A93/B126). If experience requires concepts, then the 
a priori demonstration of concepts will show them to be indispensable for experience, or,
14
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that experience is impossible without them. In other words, if experience requires 
concepts then this also means that experience requires consciousness, or, that an 
experience of which we are not consciously aware does not count as experience: "Save 
through its relation to a consciousness that is at least possible, appearance could never be 
for us an object of knowledge, and so would be nothing to us; and since it has in itself no 
objective reality, but exists only in being known, it would be nothing at all" (CPR, A120). 
Recognising this two part constitution of experience, though it may seem obvious, is 
essential to an understanding of Kant's deduction, and it will be shown that this 
commitment requires a particular temporality for a knowing/experiencing subject. Kant, 
despite his transcendental method, is not averse to taking cues from experience in an 
investigation. For as he writes: “We can, however, with regard to these concepts, as with 
regard to all knowledge, seek to discover in experience, if not the principle of their 
possibility, at least the occasioning causes of their production” (CPR, B118/A86. 
emphasis mine). Experience occurs, not only in time, but through time, and it is thus that 
it is known by an experiencing subject; not as a singular instant in time but as the 
contraction of multiple relevant aspects o f perception characterised by duration. It is in 
the possibility for the constitution of this duration of experience within Kant’s account of 
the transcendental subject that this paper is interested.
The Structure o f Apperception and the Analogous Structure o f Intuition:
Throughout the transcendental deduction of the categories Kant explains the 
functioning of apperception and the understanding by reference to the forms of intuition,
15
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particularly to the form of time. I maintain that this constant cross-referencing is not only 
an explanatory device, but that it can serve as such only because there is a common 
temporal structure which makes both accounts possible. That is, there is a structure of 
temporality at work in both, time as the form of intuition, and apperception, and this 
makes the functioning of the latter understandable in terms of the former. It may be 
objected that too much is being made of this similarity, and that the point o f coincidence 
is merely their common transcendental nature, but a deeper analysis reveals that this 
common model of functioning shows apperception to rely on the essentially temporal 
functioning of productive imagination for the possibility of experience.
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant shows the necessity of time as a form of 
intuition. All cognitive activity, as regards both internal and external objects, occurs 
within time. As Kant writes: "since all representations, whether they have for their 
objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our 
inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, 
and so belongs to time, time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever" (CPR, 
B50/A34). Space and time are the forms of intuition and the possibility of intuiting the 
manifold of appearances in determinate relations. Time however, is also the condition of 
all appearances as determinations of the mind. Now, an investigation into the connection 
between the structure of time (as the form of intuition), and apperception must begin with 
Kant's conception of, not only the components of experience, but his general outline of its 
structure.
At the very beginning of the A deduction, Kant again divides experience into two 
components with a different focus than the division given earlier. In addition to being 
divisible in terms of intuitions and concepts, we can also think of experience as being
16
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constituted by content (that which the experience is of) and its form (the structure of the 
experience itself).
...experience contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, the matter of 
knowledge [obtained] from the senses, and a certain form  for the ordering of 
this matter, [obtained] from the inner source of the pure intuition and 
thought which, on occasion of the sense-impressions, are first brought into 
action and yield concepts. (CPR, B118/A86)
So, with the first division of experience we have a distinction between the constitutive 
elements of intuition and concepts as those things which constitute the possibility of any 
actual experience. What the second differentiation shows is not so much the structures 
for actual components of experience as the necessary elements for any possible 
experience. In other words, an experience can be known as such only through the 
application of a concept through which the intuition is determinately known as 
appearance. The second distinction within experience is to show the distinction between 
what can appear and how it is possible that anything can appear. While these two 
approaches are not unrelated, they serve to identity significantly different means of 
analysing experience. One could think of these two approaches as corresponding to a 
metaphysical exposition (that experience consists o f intuitions and concepts) and a 
transcendental exposition (how a certain ordering makes objects comprehensible in 
experience). It is in this latter sense that I am interested in the constitution of experience, 
and it is in this sense that an analysis of the analogy drawn between the form of time and 
the unity of apperception is fruitful.
We must bear in mind that time, as the form of intuition, orders the manifold of 
sensation into an intuition, while the unity of apperception allows for the intuited, 
reproduced manifold to be synthesised into a concept. One must not conflate the work
17
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done by the form of time and apperception, but it is important to show how their 
functioning is analogous and draw out the implications of this. "In other words, 
appearances in experience must stand under the conditions of the necessary unity of 
apperception, just as in mere intuition they must be subject to the formal conditions of 
space and time" (CPR, A110, emphasis mine). This 'just as' is used repeatedly by Kant to 
draw the reader's attention to the similarity of functioning between apperception and the 
forms of intuition1. The deeper implications of this are not, however, made explicit by 
Kant. These implications involve an understanding of apperception as requiring a 
temporal ordering at the level of intuitions. That is, apperception cannot only be an 
ordering function of intuitions whose temporality is preconstituted by the form of those 
intuitions, but apperception must be related to appearances in virtue of the synthesised 
temporality of experience.
An analogy is being drawn between the forms of intuition, as making possible the 
intuition of appearances in experience, and apperception as making possible conscious 
experience. We know that while there are two forms of intuition, it is time which is the 
form which conditions all cognitive activity, as regards both internal and external objects. 
Thus, strictly speaking, "time is an a priori condition of all appearance whatsoever" 
(CPR, B50/A34). It is this recognition, taken in conjunction with Kant's persistent 
analogies, that led me to consider the temporal character of apperception.
Further in A110 we find, "There is one single experience in which all perceptions 
are represented as in thoroughgoing and orderly connection, just as there is only one 
space and one time in which all modes of appearance and all relation of being or not
1 cf: A107, A110-twice, A111,A118, A124, A127-twice,A128; these are only the explicit 
instances.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
being occur" (CPR, A110 emphasis mine). Here the commonality of the analogy is the 
singularity of experience and the singularity of the forms of intuition. Keeping in mind 
that what is being discussed here is the form of experience (rather than its content, as per 
the above distinction) we can see the strengthening of the assertion that the structure of 
apperception is relevantly similar to the structure of time.2
Let us take one further example: "Now I maintain that the categories, above cited, 
are nothing but the conditions o f thought in a possible experience, just as space and time 
are the conditions of intuitions for that same experience" (CPR, A111 - emphasis mine). 
Here the categories, as pure a priori modes of understanding for apperception, render 
possible the thought of an experience, just as, or in the same manner, that time (if we wish 
to include inner experiences) makes possible intuition in the constitution of an 
experience.
The purpose of all this is primarily to open the possibility for the idea of 
apperception as being constituted, in its functioning, by time or temporality. These 
analogies show that this is not unreasonable in terms of its structure, and we may now 
proceed to an analysis of temporality as it develops through the syntheses leading toward 
a fuller account of apperception as depending upon the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination.
21 recognise that the quotations used include the forms of both time and  space in the 
analogy, however, in so far as apperception, as consciousness, involves consciousness of 
both inner and outer objects, I do not think it unfair to emphasize the form of intuition 
which also concerns both inner and outer objects of intuition, in other words, time.
19
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Miller and the Temporality o f Experience:
In his article "Making Sense of Kant", Larry W. Miller focuses on the issue of 
temporality in the Critique of Pure Reason in order to clarify certain points of confusion 
in Kant's argument. Miller's purpose is to establish th a t"a quantitative synthesis in time 
precedes or is presupposed by any empirical intuition" (Miller, 95). While my purposes 
do not perfectly overlap Miller's, there are relevant points of convergence. The most 
pertinent points for consideration in this paper are Miller's account of the role of a 
synthesis of time, and his emphasis on the significance of the two part constitution of 
experience (intuition, consciousness).
As I mentioned in the introduction, Kant could proceed with his account in the
transcendental aesthetic without needing to give an account of the subject only in so far as
he is not discussing experience but merely a constitutive element thereof.
Miller also picks up on this point:
The mysterious givenness o f time as pure intuition is due to the provisional 
isolation in the Transcendental Aesthetic of sensibility from understanding, 
so synthesis is not used to explain time as pure intuition. Also, time as pure 
intuition is prior to time as form of sensibility, since a synthesis in time is 
prior to empirical intuition. Pure intuitions are empirically empty concepts, 
but provide content for pure concepts, (Miller, 100).
Kant elaborates time in the transcendental aesthetic in its necessity as a form for any 
possible intuition, but this givenness of time is not further elaborated in terms of 
experience with the introduction of apperception. Time as the form of intuition is 
necessary for any possible empirical intuition. However, even though the manifold of
20
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intuition can be represented only in so far as the mind discerns time in the sequence of 
impressions, the first synthesis, that of apprehension, is directed immediately upon 
intuition and unifies intuition in this very representation. The synthesis of apprehension 
unifies the manifold in a single representation, functions a priori, and applies to non- 
empirical representations; this yields the representations of space and time, “They can be 
produced only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in its 
original receptivity. We have thus a pure synthesis of apprehension” (CPR, A99-100). 
This application of a pure intuition to the form of intuition opens considerations of a 
synthesis of time which is prior to, and makes possible, time as the form of intuition. In 
order to give a more complete account o f the functioning of time and apperception we 
must follow the indications of our investigation and inquire into the role of time in the 
application of concepts.
Miller maintains that the role of the deduction of the categories is to provide an 
answer to the question: “since a synthesis in time precedes empirical intuitions, how can 
we justify the applicability of apriori [sic] concepts to experience?” (Miller, 101). The 
answer is, of course, that the a priori concepts make experience possible. While I agree 
that this is the answer, I maintain that Kant’s question is rather ‘how are a priori 
judgements possible given that they are actual?’. Miller’s emphasis on time relations, 
though I too find them to be of the utmost significance, remains Miller’s emphasis (and 
mine) and not Kant’s own.
In any event, it is in the third synthesis, recognition in a concept, that we find an 
explication of the object, which Miller cites in explaining the intimate relation of time and 
apperception. Citing Miller citing Kant:
21
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
An object is a necessary unity which 'can be nothing else than the formal 
unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations'
(A105), but this can only be time. The conditions of the possibility of 
objects of experience are the conditions of the possibility of experience 
(Alll ) .  (Miller, 101)
Here Miller makes two important points; first, that it is time which serves as this formal 
unity of the object for consciousness, and second, that time, as the possibility for objects 
of consciousness, is simultaneously the possibility for experience. Following from these 
two points we can see that time is not only a form of intuition rendering any intuition 
possible, but is also the possibility for experience as conscious experience. Time as the 
form of intuition is not identical to the synthesised time of experiential objects; they share 
a structure of functioning (as pointed to in the above discussion of Kant‘s analogies) but 
are of a different order. Time as the 'formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the 
manifold of representations' must already be in place for it to be possible to apply 
concepts to the intuitions synthesised by apprehension, which employs the form  of time.
Guver and the Priority o f  a Pure Synthesis:
In his article "Kant on Apperception and A Priori Synthesis", Paul Guyer attempts 
to explain that Kant's theory of a priori synthesis is the result o f a mistaken assumption 
that there is "a thoroughly synthetic connection between consciousness and the self­
ascription of experience, or ^/^-consciousness" (Guyer, 205). His conclusions in this 
article do not directly concern our purposes here; however, some points of his argument 
have significant bearing and serve to shed light upon some salient points of our 
discussion. To begin with, Guyer points out that, contrary to the assertions of some (cf.
22
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Strawson: The Bounds o f Sense) it is undeniable that Kant “...is clearly committed to the 
existence o f a creative synthesis imposing order on the manifold of empirical intuition” 
(Guyer, 206), and that this point cannot be relegated to an imaginary transcendental 
psychology which has no bearing on the main argument of the Critique. The initial 
explication of this point of Guyer’s is all that shall be dealt with here, as it serves to 
establish the recognition that there is a synthesis at work in the A deduction which is prior 
to, and makes possible, experience. It will be maintained that this prior synthesis is the 
temporality of consciousness which is made possible by the transcendental imagination.
Guyer, in giving his exposition of a transcendental synthesis prior to any empirical
intuition, also selects the A deduction as that site which is most rich in the analysis of
syntheses. Guyer is arguing for the acknowledgment of an active pure synthesis which
occurs prior to any empirical synthesis (Guyer, 206). For an explication of this, he points
us to the synthesis of reproduction in imagination in the A deduction:
"Evidence for this claim is not hard to find. It may be found in Kant's 
assertion that there is a 'synthesis of reproduction in imagination' which must 
be counted among the 'transcendental actions of the mind'...for 'this 
synthesis of imagination' he holds, 'is grounded prior to all experience on an 
a priori principle, and one must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of 
imagination which grounds even the possibility of experience' (A 101-102)"
(Guyer, 206).
Indeed, it is in the synthesis of reproductive imagination that a crucial turn occurs in 
Kant's deduction. Here we find a move from the synthesis of apprehension, which is 
directed immediately upon intuition, to a synthesis which involves creative action. Guyer 
is interested in this synthesis for precisely this reason; in attempting to establish an active 
synthesis prior to any empirical synthesis, it is the imagination which first introduces a 
productive force within the syntheses of consciousness. It is not however, as he supposes,
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the best instance of a synthesis which is necessarily prior to any empirical synthesis (but
more on this below). This synthesis of reproductive imagination is prior to experience
because "...experience as such necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of
appearances" (CPR, A101-102), and this is the work of imagination. Kant further
explicates the importance of this:
But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations 
(the first part of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units 
in the order represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to 
those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none 
of the above mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most 
elementary representations of space and time, could arise (CPR, A102, 
emphasis mine).
The synthesis of reproduction in imagination is the possibility for the basic representation 
of time, that is, any knowable experience of time, but not of time as a structure of 
experience in the form of intuition. The syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are 
intimately linked because this possibility of representing time is also necessary for the 
possibility of apprehension of the manifold, in time and through time. Since we do 
experience representations in time and have an experience o f  time, that which is necessary 
to make this possible must be the case. So, the form of time in intuition is the a priori 
condition of all appearances (inner and outer) as the form of inner sense, and the synthesis 
of reproduction is the condition for the representation of time. The form of time is 
deduced by the assertion that experiences of succession and simultaneity cannot be the 
source of a derived notion of time since these experiences presuppose a perception that is 
already, fundamentally, temporal. Time needs to be a pre-existing form of intuition for 
simultaneity and succession to be comprehensible to us. However, the representation of 
time, as depending upon the reproductive imagination, is what necessitates its being prior
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to any empirical synthesis. Succession and simultaneity are necessary for coherent 
experience and thus the synthesis which renders their representation possible must 
precede the actual experience of them. I presume that this is Guyer's point in asserting 
that the synthesis of reproductive imagination must be prior to empirical syntheses. 
However, if we follow the development of this synthesis through the establishment of 
transcendental apperception, we find a significant addition to Kant's explication of 
imagination: "only the productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori', the 
reproductive rests upon empirical grounds" (CPR, A118). While it is the case that the 
reproductive imagination make possible our representation of simultaneity and 
succession, and hence gives the impression that it precedes any empirical synthesis, Kant 
is making the point that there must be empirically intuited objects in order for them to 
occur simultaneously or in succession. Since the reproductive imagination reproduces the 
representations apprehended in the manifold of intuition, it cannot, by itself, provide the 
connection of impressions which could reinstate the previous impression concurrently 
with the next impression. This reproduction must function according to a rule so that one 
representation is connected, rather than another, in a coherent fashion. "This subjective 
and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is what is called the association 
of representations" (CPR, A121). Just as Kant could refer to a merely abstract subject in 
his discussion of the forms of intuition, so too he could defer the discussion of the 
productive imagination only until it comes ‘time’ to explicate the functioning of 
apperception in detail. And this because "the principle of the necessary unity of pure 
(productive) synthesis of imagination, prior to apperception, is the ground of the 
possibility of all knowledge, especially of experience" (CPR, A118).
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Productive Imagination:
We are now in a position to turn to the discussion of the productive imagination 
(as distinguished from the reproductive) where we shall find the basis for the temporal 
synthesis which is prior to any experience and renders experience possible. This is 
accomplished, not through time as a form of intuition, but with temporality as the ground 
for the consciousness of experience as such.
The reproductive imagination is seen to depend upon empirical syntheses since it 
is the synthesis of representations apprehended in intuition, but the rules according to 
which this reproduction occurs require grounding in a, yet prior, synthesis and this is the 
productive imagination. The association of representations which the reproductive 
imagination makes possible requires an objective ground for appearances to fit into the 
whole of human knowledge. In order to belong to a consciousness of myself, not only 
must I be able to associate perceptions, but these must themselves be associable, "For it is 
only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (original apperception) that I 
can say of all perceptions that I am conscious of them. . . This objective ground of all 
association of appearances I entitle their affinity" (CPR, A122). The objectively 
grounded unity of all possible empirical consciousness in original apperception is the 
necessary condition of knowledge, and the affinity of appearances necessarily follows 
from the faculty o f a priori, rule grounded, synthesis of imagination: productive 
imagination.
The productive imagination is a transcendental function of imagination as 
necessitating the unity (synthesis) of the manifold in appearance, without this no concepts
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could combine to form a unified experience. "That the affinity of appearances, and with 
it their association, and through this, in turn, their reproduction according to laws, and so 
[as involving these various factors] experience itself, should only be possible by, means 
of this transcendental function of imagination, is indeed strange, but is none the less an 
obvious consequence of the preceding argument" (CPR, A123). In Kant's own words 
then, we have the admission that experience itself is only possible by means of the 
productive imagination, for "By its means we bring the manifold of intuition on the one 
side, into connection with the condition of the necessary unity of apperception on the 
other. The two extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary 
connection with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of 
imagination" (CPR, A124). Allison too, though working with the B deduction, draws the 
same conclusion from Kant: “he argues that the representations of space and time as 
unities require a transcendental synthesis of imagination...then, in §26, he argues that the 
empirical synthesis of apprehension, which is constitutive of perception, is itself subject 
to the conditions of the transcendental synthesis” (Allison96, 52).
The productive imagination, as this mediating synthesis, must have a structure 
which is conducive to the mediating work which it does; there must be an element of 
commonality between sensibility and understanding which could provide the space within 
which the productive imagination can do its work. This commonality is pointed to when 
Kant, once again, reasserts his analogy in concluding his discussion of the role of the 
productive imagination: "All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure 
apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner intuition, 
namely to time" (CPR, A123-124). In this instance of the analogy the form of space has 
been dropped in order to emphasize time as the form of inner intuition, and hence, all
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sensible intuition as representation (for representations, in so far as they are known, are 
inner).
The Temporality o f  the Productive Imagination: Transcendental Memory:
Now, all consciousness is temporal, we experience our lives in terms of events 
and the unity of apperception is fundamental to the possibility for human knowledge 
because we need to be able to self-identify across time. The reproductive imagination 
cannot serve as the ground for the necessary association of images because it presupposes 
other empirical syntheses, namely apprehension in intuition. What is needed is a 
synthesis which does not depend upon other empirical syntheses, but rather makes the 
application of consciousness to the unified representations of these syntheses possible.
The pure synthesis of productive imagination is the a priori ground which provides the 
rules according to which empirical imagination can function. But, more than this, 
according to Kant, the productive imagination is also the mediating factor between these 
empirical representations and the unchanging structure of consciousness, transcendental 
apperception.
If we combine Kant's assertions that all sensible intuition as representation 
belongs to the form of time, and that transcendental apperception is the requisite structure 
of an unchanging self to which representations can be attributed consistently across time, 
we find that the mediating work of the productive imagination must be temporal in its 
functioning. Its mediating work makes possible the coherent association of 
representations and their attribution to a consciousness which is known to be the same
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through the duration of time. In other words, the productive imagination is an a priori 
structure which provides rules for the attribution of different experiential objects to the 
same consciousness and allows them to be known as such. When Kant asserts that pure 
imagination is the ground of possibility for experience, this is because it facilitates the 
relation of both sides of the equation: the comprehensible ordering of objects of 
experience, and the consciousness for whom experience is possible. Representations are 
possible only in so far as they occur within a consciousness unified in time; this principle 
is true a priori and is what makes possible the synthesis of apprehension in intuition.
Only in so far as the structure of a unified consciousness does not alter across time can 
apprehension provide unified objects of intuition for it.
By unifying the representations of experiential objects which occur in time, pure 
imagination makes possible their attribution to a self which is unchanging through time. 
This is the description of a transcendental structure of memory. The reproductive 
imagination allows for the association of different representations or images within an 
empirical consciousness but cannot itself ground the rule for these associations within 
consciousness. This can be thought of as the way we associate particular scents with 
particular events, or people.
What the productive imagination provides are the laws of affinity according to 
which it is structurally possible to order representations or images which are subject to the 
form of time (even a past time) in intuition, such that they can be known by the same 
consciousness as belonging to it, even as that empirical consciousness changes across 
time. The retention of representations across time must first be possible for the 
representations then to be attributed to the same consciousness in the future; this is the 
work of memory. Kant writes that it must be possible to attribute objects to
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consciousness as the same consciousness across time; nowhere is this required more than 
in the functioning of memory. Memory is only possible in so far as past experiential 
objects are not only recalled to consciousness, but recalled as distinctively mine. The 
productive imagination is precisely that which renders possible such an attribution of 
objects of consciousness to the same consciousness across different times, prior to any 
actual, or empirical, instantiation of this faculty. This is the transcendental structure of 
the possibility for the association of memories and their attribution to a structurally 
identical consciousness. In so far as memory is the application of past representations to 
a self which is conscious of the self-identity which this attribution of memories implies, it 
requires a grounding synthesis which performs the temporal unification of the productive 
imagination. A temporal synthesis which mediates between past images, known as such, 
and a self-identical consciousness must precede any empirical possibility for the 
association of memories as mine, just as "The synthesis of the manifold through pure 
imagination, the unity of all representations in relation to original apperception, precede 
all empirical knowledge" (CPR, A130).
The reproductive imagination synthesises representations such that one thing 
follows another; Kant shows that, for this to be possible, there must be a grounding 
synthesis which provides the rules according to which this ordering functions. We can 
easily see how this is also the possibility for memory; we recall (bring to consciousness) 
past events that involve a temporal ordering which is internal to the representation itself. 
That is, we can bring to consciousness objects in an order in which we did not actually 
encounter them (I can think of yesterday before I think of my last birthday), but the 
representations contain within themselves, as part of their very constitution, a temporal 
ordering (I know that my birthday actually preceded yesterday in terms of the order in
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which I experienced them). This is evidence of a temporal synthesis at work within our 
representations which allows for the attribution of representations to the same 
consciousness across time, but also, as being internally structured by a temporality of 
experience which is coherent for that consciousness, as of its own experiential 
constitution. Such a synthesis cannot be known only in a derivative way from our 
experience of memories, for, it is presupposed by memories. The pure synthesis of 
productive imagination is thus, also the transcendental structure of memory. It cannot be 
derived from empirical consciousness of memories for it is necessary for their possibility, 
and hence is transcendental. It is the temporal synthesis through which it becomes 
possible to attribute objects of consciousness to the same consciousness across time, and 
hence is transcendental memory.
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Chapter Two 
Schematism: Time Determination and Memory.
Introduction; transition to schematism, and principles, o f  understanding:
Kant’s schematism of the understanding is of pivotal importance for this 
investigation into imagination, temporality, and memory since it is here that we find an 
elaboration of the implications of the productive imagination as a fundamental power of 
human knowledge and experience. The transcendental schematism is a product of 
imagination and its functioning is exclusively temporal in character. It shall be shown 
that this elaboration of imagination’s influence is completely co-extensive with and 
complementary to the description of a transcendental structure of memory being 
developed in this paper. In the previous chapter it was established that the transcendental 
synthesis of productive imagination is indispensable to the possibility for the combination 
of concepts to form a unified experience. Further, productive imagination is the 
mediating factor between empirical representations and the unchanging and abiding I: 
transcendental apperception. In this capacity, I argued, the productive imagination can be 
read as a description of a transcendental structure of memory in so far as this synthesis 
performs the temporal grounding required for the attribution of objects to consciousness 
as the same consciousness across different times. This transcendental and temporal 
grounding is necessarily prior to any actual instantiation of empirical memory as the 
possibility of the empirical. In the present chapter, the schematism shall be shown to be
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the consistent elaboration of the powers of the productive imagination, as a transcendental 
structure of memory, as Kant explains the possibility for the application of pure concept 
of understanding to appearances. The explication of the schematism hinges upon the 
importance of time as the ground of possibility for the application of concepts to 
appearances. The schemata, as fundamentally temporal, are the expression of the 
transcendental synthesis of productive imagination and an analysis thereof strengthens the 
position that the productive imagination is identical with a transcendental structure of 
memory, and further, provides the site at which it can be seen how transcendental 
memory makes experiential objects possible.
Kant is not primarily concerned with every particular empirical determination of 
judgment, but rather the structure of transcendental judgment that renders possible 
judgment as such. His elaboration of the transcendental doctrine of judgment is broken 
down into two primary divisions; first, the schematism of the understanding, which gives 
the sensible conditions under which the pure concepts of understanding are applicable to 
appearances, and second, the principles of pure understanding: synthetic judgments which 
follow a priori from the pure concepts of understanding and which are the foundation of 
all other modes of knowledge.
Schematism: Summary and Explication:
Kant’s exclusive concern in the schematism is the possible relation of pure 
concepts of understanding, on the one hand, with appearances on the other. Kant defines 
this relation as one of subsumption; however, this relation of subsuming an appearance
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under a concept is not a straightforward one, for: “In all subsumption of an object under a 
concept the representation of the object must be homogenous with the concept; in other 
words, the concept must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be 
subsumed under it” (CPR, A137/B176). This presents a problem for Kant because there 
can be no greater heterogeneity than that between a pure, that is, devoid of empirical 
content, concept of understanding, and sensible, or empirical, intuitions. Kant gives, as 
an example of an object being contained under a concept, the empirical concept of a plate 
being homogenous with the pure geometrical concept of circle; “the roundness which is 
thought in the latter can be intuited in the former” (CPR, A137/B176). This is not 
straightforwardly possible for pure concepts and intuitions. For example, the concept ‘of 
causality and dependence’ cannot be intuited in appearance (as was stressed by Hume, 
and as was demonstrated in the Transcendental Aesthetic). To solve this problem of 
subsuming intuitions under pure concepts, which is synonymous with the application of 
the categories, a third, mediating, element is required. This third ‘thing’ (mediating 
representation), in order to play the mediating role, must be homogenous with the 
category (pure from empirical content) on the one hand, and also be homogeneous with 
appearance (both intellectual and sensible) on the other. This mediating representation is 
what Kant terms the transcendental schema.
Regarding the description of the schema as a third ‘thing’, which Kant gives at 
B177/A138, we must guard against thinking the schema as a definite thing in the sense of 
objectivity, or worse, physicality. Shortly after the characterisation of the schema as the 
necessitated third thing (which occurs only once) Kant specifies that the schema is a 
mediating representation. This caveat is here given in preparation for the discussion of 
Norman Kemp Smith’s analysis of the schematism, in which much is made of this one
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time, though admittedly ill-phrased, description of a schema. But we shall come to this 
later.
The key element in the elaboration of the schematism is time; it is time which can 
serve as the ground for the mediation necessary for the subsumption of intuitions under 
concepts. As discussed earlier, it is time which, as the form of inner sense and hence any 
possible representation whatsoever, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. In 
Kant’s words: “a transcendental determination of time is so far homogenous with the 
category, which constitutes its unity, in that it is universal and rests upon an a priori rule” 
(CPR, B177/A138 - B178/A139). However, time, as the form of both outer and inner 
intuition must apply to every actual representation of the manifold and hence is seen to be 
homogeneous with appearance. Time, considered as the formal condition of the 
possibility for the connection of all representations, is understood as being universal. 
Hence, time is understood as necessarily applying, a priori, to any representation. It is 
also the case, when considering that every representation must occur in time, that time 
applies to every actual representation of the manifold. Time is homogeneous with, both, 
the category as a priori (the condition of experience), and appearance as representation 
(the content of experience). “Thus an application of the categories to appearances 
becomes possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the 
schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearance 
under the category” (CPR, B178/A139).
Now, with the deduction of the categories, Kant established the necessity of 
certain structures of understanding. This is often described by commentators as the top- 
down approach since it can be viewed as an attempt to establish that the categories are 
necessary for any knowledge of objects, while the schematism is viewed as serving as the
36
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
converse explication; or the bottom-up approach, in which the application of concepts to 
objects is shown to be possible. The debate surrounding this characterisation of Kant’s 
project need not waylay us here. What is important to notice is that, in the schematism, 
Kant stresses the limitations which sensibility places upon the application of the 
categories. Kant points out that since objects can only be given to us through a 
modification of our sensibility, pure concepts must contain, a priori, certain formal 
conditions of inner sense (CPR. B178/A139). This stipulation serves a twofold purpose; 
it warns against falling into the misapprehension of thinking that categories apply to 
things in themselves, and it opens our thinking to the description of an inter-relation 
between sensibility and understanding (which is forthcoming): “These conditions of 
sensibility constitute the universal condition under which alone the category can be 
applied to any object. This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the 
employment of the concept of understanding is restricted, we shall entitle the schema of 
the concept” (CPR, A140/B179).
Kant opens his detailed account of the schematism with a blunt, and for our 
purposes, essential, description of a schema: “The schema is in itself always a product of 
imagination" (CPR, B179/A140). In the analysis to follow this summary I shall give a 
complete explication of the necessity and implications of this characterisation, but for 
now I shall continue with the exegesis. Kant stipulates that the synthesis of imagination 
achieves the unity o f a determination of sensibility, not the synthesis of a particular 
intuition (since it does not concern the synthesis of a particular intuition, the imagination 
referred to here must be the productive, rather than reproductive). There is required then, 
a distinction between the schema, which is the mediating element between concept and 
intuition, and the image, as it relates only to particular sensations.
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In order to elaborate this distinction Kant gives the example of five dots [......... ].
From the appearance of the dots we have an image of the number five, but this becomes 
more difficult when we increase the number, for example, in thinking about one thousand. 
When we think about a number in general (as we must do with one thousand), we then 
have the representation of a method for representing a multiplicity in an image, in 
conformity with a concept, rather than just an image itself. “This representation of a 
universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept, I entitle the 
schema of this concept” (CPR, A140/B180). It is not images, but schemata which 
underlie pure sensible concepts; concepts are universal, images are particular. An image 
can never be adequate to a concept since it is only in virtue of the application of the 
concept that the image is then derived from appearances. “The image is the product of 
the empirical faculty of reproductive imagination; the schema of sensible concepts, such 
as figures in space, is a product and , as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori 
imagination, through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first 
become possible” (CPR, B181/A142). The productive imagination yields the schemata 
which shall be seen to make empirical memory possible, while images are akin to actual 
memories themselves. As explained in the previous chapter, the productive imagination 
is a temporal synthesis which makes it possible to attribute objects of consciousness to the 
same consciousness across time. This is why it is equivalent to a transcendental memory. 
The schemata, as the products of this synthesis, determine appearances in their specific 
temporal character which makes them possible objects of experience. Images, on the 
other hand, as the products of empirical, reproductive imagination, presuppose the work 
of the schemata in order to have knowable appearances of which to form an image. It is 
thus easy to understand why a pure concept of understanding can never be brought into an
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image. If we take as an example the concept of causality, we see that we can form no 
image thereof, the way that we could form an image of ‘five’ from then series of dots.
And this, for the same reasons which Kant gives, along with Hume, against the possibility 
for deducing causation from appearances. We can see here an elaboration of the powers 
of the distinct imaginations discussed in the previous chapter: the image, as product of the 
reproductive imagination, is always empirically grounded and presupposes, as its 
possibility, the schema, as product of the productive imagination. The schema “is a 
transcendental product of imagination, a product which concerns the determination of 
inner sense in general according to conditions of its form (time), in respect of all 
representations, in so far as these representations are to be connected a priori in one 
concept in conformity with the unity of apperception” (CPR, B181/A142).
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this work is not so much concerned with 
the particular content of the concepts of the understanding which Kant has deduced, as it 
is focused on the necessity of the structures which underlie the possible functioning of 
any pure concepts of the understanding. In other words, while I do not raise any 
objections to the particular categories or concepts deduced by Kant, neither need I fully 
endorse them as either accurate or exhaustive. What is important is that the productive 
imagination and time are seen to play essential roles in the functioning of any such 
transcendental structures of human knowledge, and experience, described in Kant’s 
system. So it is that, in coming to Kant’s descriptions of the particular schema for each of 
the categories and concepts thereof, I shall not involve myself in the speculative project 
of reading Kant’s limited treatment of a category (namely quantity), as potential evidence
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that Kant himself did not believe his deduction to be exhaustive etc.3 The remainder of 
my summation of the schematism then, shall have as its focus the fundamental 
importance of time in making any mediating representation (schema) possible for each of 
the categories, rather than the potential weaknesses, if there be any, in particular 
categories given.
The first of the categories is that of quantity, which Kant discusses in the 
schematism as magnitude. The pure schema of any concept of the understanding under 
the category of magnitude is number. This is because the schema of magnitude is a 
representation which, through its synthesis, results in the successive addition of 
homogenous units. Successive addition is what makes possible the image of the number 
‘five’ in the above example of the successive dots. As a synthesis which comprises 
succession, it must necessary be temporal; if it were not, we could not contract the five 
otherwise temporally separate dots into a single image. Rather than an image of the 
number ‘five’, the dots could only be thought, in turn, as: ‘one, one, one, one, one’. 
“Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous 
intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the 
intuition” (CPR, B182/A143. emphasis mine). The schema of magnitude is what makes a 
knowable past possible for us. The generation of time itself, characterised as succession, 
gives us the notion of time as linear and allows us to distinguish the present (as that which 
has succeeded the past) from the past. By establishing this fundamental time 
determination, the schema of magnitude opens the possibility for us to continue to know 
ourselves, and the world, even after the present has become the past. This is a necessary
3 For a persuasive defence of this apparent omission on Kant’s part, see Paton’s Kant’s Metaphysics of 
Experience vol. II, pp37-39.
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ground for any possibility for memory, without which our knowledge would be 
condemned to the apprehension of successive presents which, as in the example of the 
five dots, could not even be known as successive.4 Productive imagination is a temporal 
synthesis by which it is possible to attribute objects of consciousness to the same 
consciousness across time; however, it is in virtue of the schema of magnitude that 
appearances are temporally determined, such that my past is, not only, known as mine, 
but known as past in a temporal succession. A past that is knowable as such is the sine 
qua non for any account of memory.
Next we come to the category of quality, with its three concepts: reality, negation, 
and limitation. The schema of reality is that which determines being in time, and, 
conversely, negation is that determination of not-being in time. “The opposition of these 
two thus rests upon the distinction of one and the same time as filled and as empty” (CPR, 
B182/A143). Finally, the concept of limitation is not explicitly named, however, a 
charitable reading will find that what Kant is describing in the remainder of his account of 
the category of quality is the sensible application of a concept of limitation. Kant 
describes the relation between reality and negation as one of transition, or degree. Every 
sensation has a degree such that “it can fill out one and the same time, that is, occupy 
inner sense more or less completely, down to its cessation in nothingness ( =0= negatio)” 
(CPR, B182/A143). The schema of the category of quality then, is the determination of 
time, as inner sense, as it is filled to a greater or lesser degree by sensation or reality.
These two (sensation and reality) are the same as far as we are concerned since we have 
not to do with things in themselves, but objects as appearances subject to the conditions
4 This of course is impossible since every instant, or present, is necessarily characterised by duration (as 
will be shown) and hence presupposes the time generation of the schema of magnitude. This is simply 
intended to demonstrate the necessity of temporal succession for human knowledge, and memory.
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of sensibility. “The schema of a reality, as the quantity of something in so far as it fills 
time, is just this continuous and uniform production o f that reality in time as we 
successively descend from a sensation which has a certain degree to its vanishing point, 
or progressively ascend from its negation to some magnitude of it” (CPR, A143/B183. 
emphasis mine). In other words, the work which the schemata of quality accomplish is 
the filling of time with appearances in temporally determinate ways. These schemata, 
quite simply, determine that appearances necessarily occur in time. The schema of 
magnitude generates time itself as successive and the schemata of quality give this 
successive temporality its content. The former is the possibility of a past and the latter 
determines that which has passed. The syntheses of the schemata of quality allow for the 
content of memory, the determination of appearances as, not only necessarily belonging 
to time (for this is accomplished by the form of intuition), but as belonging to a 
temporality which can be known, and which can be known to pass. These schemata then, 
presuppose and build upon the schema of succession: upon a successive temporality, as 
the possibility for memory, is founded the content of memory.
Third in the series comes the category of relation, with its concepts: i) of 
inherence and subsistence (substantia et accidens), ii) of causality and dependence (cause 
and effect), iii) of community (reciprocity between agent and patient). “The schema of 
substance is the permanence of the real in time, that is, the representation of the real as a 
substrate of empirical determinations of time in general, and so abiding while all else 
changes” (CPR, A143/B183). In other words, certain appearances are not permanent; 
they appear and pass away, and this occurs in time. However, time itself, the ground in 
and through which what passes, passes is not itself transitory; time itself abides. What 
corresponds to this temporal abiding in appearance is substance. It is in relation to
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
substance that, both, succession (causality) and coexistence (reciprocity) regarding 
appearances can be determined in time. The schema as it relates to causality then, is the 
succession of the manifold according to a rule. As it relates to community; the schema 
determines coexistence, according to a universal rule of determinations in time, of one 
substance simultaneously with another (CPR, A144/B184). The schema, as it relates the 
category of relation then, can be thought as determining the ordering in time of 
appearances; substance: permanence in time, causality: before and after, and community: 
simultaneity in time. Time ordering has obvious connections with the structure of 
memory: past, past remembered in the present but as past, contracting of past in the 
present toward the future in anticipation: anticipating the effect to follow the cause. The 
schemata of relation establish the time-order of appearances; the relation of appearances 
to each other (and themselves) within and through time. In virtue of these schemata, I can 
know that the car I left in the parking lot three hours ago stands in a distant successive 
relation to that same car when I bought it two years ago (it is much worse for wear).
Also, when I get into the car again and turn the ignition I anticipate that, once the turning 
of the ignition has become past (cause), the engine will start (effect). The schemata of 
relation rely upon both the schema of magnitude for the generation of time, and the past, 
itself, and the schemata of quality for determining appearances within time. What 
relation’s schemata accomplish is the temporal determination of appearances in relation 
to each other within time, and most notably, within the past. Further, these schemata 
make it possible for me to discern the order of different memories within time: I know 
that I broke my clavicle after my sixteenth birthday but before Christmas, and during the 
second period of a hockey game. It is thus that memories are not only possible as past
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(magnitude), and as mine (quality), but also that they can have an internal coherence for 
me with reference to other memories and the present.
Finally comes the category of modality, with the concepts of possibility- 
impossibility, existence-non-existence, and necessity-contingency. “The schema of 
possibility is the agreement of the synthesis of different representations with the 
conditions of time in general” (CPR, A144/B184). For example, opposite attributes 
cannot coexist in the same appearance at the same determination of time, but only, if at 
all, successively. This schema then, is a time determination of a representation at some 
particular time, such that it restricts the simultaneous appearance of that which can only 
occur successively. This time determination is what prevents confusing the past with the 
present as we recollect the past in the present. Memories would be nonsensical if we 
were to remember events that have passed but believed them to be occurring before our 
eyes in the present. In other words, experience (past and present) to be possible we 
cannot know them as simultaneously past and present. Regarding existence and non­
existence, the schema is simply existence at some determinate time. Similarly with 
necessity and contingency; the schema is the determination of an object at all times 
(necessity) or some delimited duration of time (contingency). We can see here the 
contraction of a memory into a delimited duration, the memory of my tenth birthday does 
not encompass the entire time from that day up to the present; it has a certain duration 
which renders it manageable and sensible to me as remembering it.
We are thus in a position to recognise that, as Kant writes: “the schema of each 
category contains and makes capable of representation only a determination of time” 
(CPR, B184/A145). The schema of magnitude is the generation of time itself, time as 
ground in which appearances can occur, be ordered, and have duration; it is the
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generation of the ‘series of time’ and the possibility for a knowable past. The schema of
quality is the filling of time with appearances, it is here that we find “the synthesis of
sensation or perception with the representation of time” (B184/A145); it is the ‘content of
time’ and hence the content of memory. The schema of relation establishes the
connection of appearances according to a determinate ordering of time: abiding in time,
occurring successively in time, and coexisting in time. It is the ‘order of time’ and the
temporal ordering of memories. The schema of modality involves the determination of
objects as occurring or not (in time), and for a certain duration; it is the ‘scope of time’
and the determining of duration for memories within time. The schemata of
understanding express the significance of time, taken beyond mere form of intuition,
through the power of productive imagination, as the fundamental condition for knowledge
and experience of objects:
It is evident therefore, that what the schematism of understanding effects by 
means of the transcendental synthesis of imagination is simply the unity of 
all the manifold o f intuition in inner sense, and so indirectly the unity of 
apperception which as a function corresponds to the receptivity of inner 
sense. The schemata of the pure concepts o f understanding are thus the true 
and sole conditions under which these concepts obtain relation to objects 
and so possess significance (CPR, B185/A146)
The schemata both realise and restrict the categories; they realise their empirical 
employment by subordinating appearances to universal rules of synthesis, leading to 
connection in one experience. However, they limit the categories in their application to 
conditions which are sensible, and therefore beyond the prerogative of understanding 
alone. The schemata represent things only as they appear; pure concepts of 
understanding, since they are stripped of all sensible conditions, have only a logical
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meaning, signifying only the unity of the representations, but cannot represent an object 
(CPR, B186/A147).
I shall defer the discussion of the principles of understanding, which follows the 
schematism in Kant’s Critique, to a later chapter since, neither is it necessary for our 
purposes here, nor is there adequate space in this chapter for discussion of the axioms, 
anticipations, and analogies. I shall now entertain some of the secondary literature on the 
subject of the schematism, and through a discussion thereof, further elaborate the ground 
for the position of this paper that there is a transcendental structure of memory at work in 
the Critique which is both necessary and productive for Kant’s account of the conditions 
of possibility for human knowledge and experience.
Norman Kemp Smith’s Critique o f  the Schematism: Making Space for Time:
In his A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’. Norman Kemp Smith 
begins his discussion of the schematism by defining the project as “preparatory in 
character; it draws attention to the importance of the temporal aspect of human 
experience, and defines the categories in the form in which they are present themselves in 
an experience thus conditioned by a priori intuition” (K.S. 333). This depiction of the 
schematism, along with much of Kemp Smith’s following commentary, I find partially 
accurate, and partially misled. It is no doubt true that the temporal aspect of human 
experience, in its constitution, is of the utmost import in the schematism. However, the 
question of whether the schematism is merely preparatory in nature, rather than the very
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core of Kant’s account of human experience as temporal5, we shall defer answering until 
we have also examined the principles of understanding.
Kemp Smith’s primary objection to the schematism is that it is altogether 
unnecessary, and he speculates that Kant inserted the section only as a result of his being 
beholden to the architectonic structure of the Critique as a whole (K.S. 332). I am in no 
position to analyze, nor am I interested in, analyzing Kant’s work in terms of the 
symmetrical structure thereof. Let us proceed then to the content of Kemp Smith’s 
objection; in brief, it runs as follows: Kant stipulates that pure concepts and intuitions are 
heterogeneous; however, if this is the case then no subsumption is possible, and if this is 
not the case then the schematism is not needed (K.S. 334). I do not think that Kant would 
disagree with this description; it seems to be simply another phrasing of Kant’s problem. 
What Kemp Smith seems to miss, is Kant’s solution as what may be considered a two- 
step subsumption. Kant writes that it is because concepts and intuition are heterogeneous 
that no straightforward subsumption is possible. That is why the schematism is needed. 
What Kant proposes is that the mediating element, the schema, shall be homogenous with 
the sensuous intuition, thus opening the possibility for subsumption under the concept 
with which the schema is also homogenous. The schema can be thought of as performing 
a sort of synthesizing translation, such that concept and intuition can combine for 
coherent experience, and the language of commonality is temporality.
Kemp Smith takes further issue with Kant by positing that the difference between 
concept and sensible intuition is merely a functional one: “The category is formal and 
determines structure; intuition yields the content which is thereby organised.
3 Far an explication of this position see Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, to be discussed 
in the following chapter.
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Accordingly, the ‘third thing’ which Kant postulates as required to bring the category and 
intuition together, is not properly so describable; it is simply the two co-operating in the 
manner required for the possibility of experience.” (K.S. 334). Kemp Smith does not 
elaborate upon what this co-operating ‘manner required’ might be; we are left to assume 
that it might very well be as Kant describes the process and that Kemp Smith is simply 
taking issue with Kant’s language. Too much is made of Kant’s use of the word ‘thing’ 
(as forewarned above); Kant specifies that this third ‘thing’ (again I must point out that 
this descriptor occurs only once in manner of introduction) is still a representation and no 
more relies upon thingness than an awareness of phenomena requires knowledge of 
noumena for Kant. Let us reproduce the offending instance for the sake of clarity: 
“Obviously there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with 
the category, and on the other hand with the appearance, and which thus makes the 
application of the former to the latter possible. This mediating representation must be...” 
[emphasis mine B177/A138]. It is clear that, on a charitable reading, all Kant is 
attempting to say by way of introduction is that there is a third thing, in the sense of 
something third, which is required. If there were even a single other instance of the 
schema being so described, especially in a text so concerned with objects and our possible 
knowledge thereof, I might be inclined to lend this objection further credence; but not as 
it stands.
So, following up his assertion that the schematism does not involve a third thing, 
which I think we can grant him, Kemp Smith would like to redefine the schematism as a 
process of synthetic interpretation, rather than subsumption, and for his support, he refers 
to A 124 without citing any particular sentence. I am quite sympathetic to Kemp Smith’s 
inclination to describe the schematism as synthetic interpretation (I did so myself in the
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earlier analogy of the language of temporality), but I do not think that this precludes
Kant’s general notion of the schematism as facilitating subsumption. However, the
passage from the A deduction to which Kemp Smith refers is one of pivotal importance
for my own position, so let us explore the matter more fully. A124 runs thus:
All consciousness as truly belongs to an all-comprehensive pure 
apperception, as all sensible intuition, as representation, does to a pure inner 
intuition, namely to time. It is this apperception which must be added to 
pure imagination, in order to render its function intellectual. For since the 
synthesis of imagination connects the manifold only as it appears in 
intuition, as, for instance, in the shape of a triangle, it is, though exercised a 
priori, always in itself sensible. And while concepts, which belong to the 
understanding, are brought into play through relation of the manifold to the 
unity of apperception, it is only by means of the imagination that they can be 
brought into relation to sensible intuition.
A pure imagination, which conditions all a priori knowledge, is thus 
one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul. By its means we bring 
the manifold of intuition on the one side, into connection with the condition 
of the necessary unity of pure apperception on the other. The two extremes, 
namely sensibility and understanding, must stand in necessary connection 
with each other through the mediation of this transcendental function of 
imagination, because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding 
appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and 
consequently no experience. Actual experience, which is constituted by 
apprehension, association (reproduction), and finally recognition of 
appearances, contains in recognition, the last and highest o f these merely 
empirical elements of experience, certain concepts which render possible the 
formal unity o f experience, and therewith all objective validity (truth) of 
empirical knowledge (CPR, A124 emphasis mine).
I assume that the section which I have underlined is that to which Kemp Smith refers in 
desiring to stress the functioning between concept and sensible intuition as a process of 
synthetic interpretation. Since pure productive imagination is a temporally constituting 
synthesis, as I have argued previously, it remains consistent for Kant to develop the 
schematism as the explication of this temporal synthesis in term of the categories in 
particular. What A124 establishes is merely that a synthesis needs to ground the relation
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of concepts and intuitions; this pointing to transcendental imagination as the basis for the 
relation cannot be the complete account as Kemp Smith wishes. It is the essential 
temporality of the relation making subsumption possible which gets explicated in the 
schematism and is not made explicit in A124.
Regarding the productive imagination, and its relation to the schematism, Kemp 
Smith writes: “Kant’s description of the schema as ‘a third thing’, at once intellectual and 
sensuous, seems to be in large part due to the transference to it of predicates already 
applied to the faculty which is supposed to be its source” (K.S. 337). Kemp Smith 
recognises the key to understanding what is at work in the schematism, namely that pure 
imagination is the source of schemata, and yet is confused that temporal synthesis is a 
function of one as well as the other6. Kant stresses, again and again, that “the schema of 
each category contains and makes capable of representation only a determination of time” 
(CPR, B184/A145).
Speaking of time, the final objection which Kemp Smith brings to bear on the 
schematism chapter is that the schemata are actually just the categories, and that Kant 
unjustifiably privileges time (over space) in his account7. “Kant’s manner of employing 
the term ‘category’ is a typical example of his characteristic carelessness in the use of his 
technical terms. Sometimes it signifies the pure forms of understanding. But more 
frequently it stands for what he now, for the first time, entitles schemata, namely the pure 
conceptual forms as modified through relation to time” (K.S., 339). Kemp Smith can
6 In all fairness, it can be assumed that Kemp Smith later abandoned this objection since his elaboration 
thereof is based upon an error in the text (A141/B180) where Kant wrote productive imagination, when 
reproductive imagination is obviously intended. An error which Kemp Smith himself later recognised as 
typographical when he came to the work of his definitive translation of the Critique; cf. CPR pl83, footnote 
1.
7 These are actually presented as two separate objections in Kemp Smith’s text but, as I shall demonstrate, 
they stem from the same misapprehension and so are given together for economy of refutation.
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claim that the schemata are the categories only by ignoring that the productive 
imagination transfers its temporal synthetic power to the schemata, and then being 
ignorant of the importance of this for any possible experience as relation between concept 
and sensible intuition. The categories are not temporal, experience is; temporality cannot 
be derived from sensible experience, it is presupposed by it. The ‘modification through 
relation to time’ (schematism) is severely underappreciated by Kemp Smith if he thinks 
that the schemata, with their essential temporal determinations, are still identical with the 
pure categories. Indeed, it seems that Kemp Smith does not understand the importance of 
time at all: “It may be asked why Kant in this chapter so completely ignores space. No 
really satisfactory answer seems to present itself....Kant’s concentration on the temporal 
aspects of experience is exceedingly arbitrary, and results in certain unfortunate 
consequences” (K.S., 341). If Kemp Smith is convinced both that no ‘third thing’ is 
required for the subsumption of appearance under a concept, and that temporality adds 
nothing of import to a category, it is not surprising that he finds Kant’s emphasis on time 
‘arbitrary’. For a concise and lucid rebuttal to this objection we may turn to Henry E, 
Allison:
Has not Kant here, as well as with the other schemata, unjustifiably 
ignored space? And is it not necessary that the categories have spatial as 
well as temporal schemata? The response to this frequently expressed 
objection is a simple no. It rests upon the failure to distinguish between 
the sphere of objects to which and the necessary and sufficient conditions 
under which the categories are to be applied. The sphere includes spatial 
as well as temporal entities, and thus all objects of possible experience. 
Nevertheless, the categories relate to these objects in virtue of their 
temporality. This follows directly from the role given to time as the 
universal form of all appearances (since all appearances are ‘modifications 
of inner sense’) (Allison81, 79).
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Much of Kemp Smith’s objections stem from his apparent desires to keep the various 
elements (not to say ‘things’) involved completely separate while discussing a chapter 
whose primary project is to explain to synthetic temporal functioning of these elements. 
To ignore the importance of temporality in making experience (as the application of 
concepts to appearances) possible, is to miss the very possibility for us to know our 
world, our role in it, and our memories thereof.
Allison’s Elaboration o f the Schematism: reidenti fication and memory:
In Henry E. Allison’s article “Transcendental Schematism and The Problem of the 
Synthetic A Priori” we find an account o f the schematism which focuses on the relation 
between the schemata and the categories. It is Allison’s position that this relation is both 
synthetic and a priori, and hence, requires a deduction that Kant does not give but which 
can be constructed from what Kant does write regarding the categories and the 
schematism. “Kant claims that, given the category and given time as the form of inner 
sense, it is possible to provide the schema or the sensible condition for the realization of 
the category. But he does not give us any clue as to just how this is to be done” 
(Allison81, 83). It is not my intention here to evaluate either the necessity or the success 
of Allison’s project, but rather to point out that such an attempt to elaborate on the work 
of the schematism leads to considerations of temporality and, importantly, memory. The 
article culminates with Allison giving a possible deduction for the pure concept of 
substance in which he introduces the condition of ‘reidentifiability’ as a necessary 
condition for the determination of a manifold which is specifically temporal. This
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condition of reidentifiability will be seen to be completely compatible with the assertion 
of this work; namely that, since the transcendental imagination functions as a 
transcendental ground of memory, the schemata (as the product of transcendental 
imagination/memory) will likewise show themselves to be, not only temporal, but 
mnemonic structures which make experience possible. A brief summation of the relevant 
points of Allison’s article will serve the dual purpose of elucidating the path which leads 
to Allison’s condition of reidentifiability, as well as drawing out the temporal details of 
the schematism which are essential to my main thesis.
Allison’s primary concern is that, while the transcendental deduction shows the 
concepts to have objective validity in virtue of the transcendental synthesis of 
imagination, and the principles of pure understanding establish that the schemata are 
necessary conditions of a temporally ordered world, a deduction is required to link the 
schemata with the categories. Whether this be so or not, the content of Allison’s 
argument brings to light certain pertinent aspects of the schematism which are well suited 
for demonstrating that the schemata, as products of transcendental memory, make 
possible experience within a temporally ordered world. That is, the schemata make 
possible empirical memory and experience in virtue of being the product of 
transcendental memory.
Kant describes a schema as a “transcendental determination of time”
(A139/B178). In his discussion of this characterisation, Allison is careful to distinguish
between schemata, as the conditions of these determinations, and time as the form or
condition of intuition:
As conditions of empirical time determination, they [schemata] are certainly 
conditions in a different sense than space and time themselves. The latter 
are general forms or conditions of sensibility, that is, conditions under and
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with reference to which the data of empirical intuition are given to the mind; 
while transcendental determinations of time are specific temporal conditions 
of actual empirical intuitions (empirical time determination). Nevertheless, 
they are still conditions of empirical intuition and, therefore, pure intuitions 
in the Kantian sense (Allison81, 73).
If we are to link up schemata with mnemonic structures, this point of Allison’s can
serve to draw an important contrast: while transcendental imagination is
equivalent to a transcendental structure of memory, the schemata, as the products
of productive imagination are not yet what we think of as empirical, or actual,
memories themselves. The schema of a concept is what makes possible the
relation of a concept to an appearance and is not itself an appearance. So too, the
mnemonic function, which the schemata are seen to serve, is not the production of
memories themselves but their possibility insofar as actual memories require, for
their possibility, certain determinations in time which render them comprehensible
to us (past, content, order, and duration). Allison’s distinction forewarns against
confusing the temporal determining that is accomplished by a schema with the
form of all appearance as conditioned by time as the form of intuition. The latter
is a necessary condition for any intuition whatsoever, prior to any necessary
cognition thereof. The former, however, determines the manner in which
appearances are temporal and thereby makes possible the cognition thereof. The
latter requires that appearances occur in time; the former determines the temporal
character of any possible appearance which renders it comprehensible to us.
Allison maintains that a synthetic a priori judgment is required to connect the 
category with its schema, and that this judgment, in turn, requires a ground. Allison 
selects two points from the Transcendental Analytic which he considers to be essential to 
the task of elaborating upon the schematism. These two points are the same ones upon
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which this paper has been insisting: “1) that the categories, as rules for the transcendental
synthesis o f the imagination, serve to determine time (the form of inner sense), and 2) that
the schema is in each the product of such determination. Assuming these premises, I
believe that it is possible to construct a plausible case for the schemata which Kant
assigns to the categories” (Allison81, 78). What is important to note is that when Allison
is seeking to ground his proposed deduction, he cites the two points which he, rightfully,
views to be the core of the schematism. These points are also what allow for my claim
that the structures of memory are essential to, and identifiable with the possibility of
experience. To rephrase these points in light of this and the previous chapter, we have the
core of the schematism as: 1) that the categories as rules for the condition of the
possibility of memory (transcendental memory/productive imagination) serve to
determine time, and 2) that the past, content of memories, order of memories, and
duration of memories (schemata) are the products of such determinations.
At the conclusion of his article, Allison attempts to give a deduction for the
schema of the category of substance, and it is here that he finds the need to introduce the
notion of reidentifiability as necessary for connecting schema to category:
As indicated above, what we must do is to consider how a specifically 
temporal manifold is to be determined i.e., conceptualized, if it is to be 
subject to the categorical form of judgment. This is equivalent to 
specifying the conditions under which one can say of anything temporal 
that it is a real subject of accidents (rather than a merely logical subject of 
predicates). Perhaps the most obvious candidate for such a necessary 
condition is reidentifiability. Only something that is reidentifiable 
throughout a change of states can be distinguished from one or more of 
these states and considered as their ‘real subject’, that is, as something to 
which these states pertain as modifications or in which they ‘inhere’ as 
accidents. But in order for something temporal to be reidentifiable, it is 
necessary that it endure or be permanent. (Allison81, 81)
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The necessary condition of reidentifiability has obvious connections to the assertion that 
the structures here at work are structures of memory. Indeed, this is why Allison finds 
reidentifiability an “obvious candidate”. In order to reidentify something across time it 
must be remembered. Allison does not attempt a deduction for each of the categories but 
points out a strategy which could be employed to do so. This strategy of deducing the 
connection between the schema and its category points to the importance of memory for 
judgments concerning the relation between the two. It is only in virtue of a temporality, 
which can be expressed in terms of the conditions of possibility for memory, that the 
connection between concept and appearance is possible. It is not surprising then, that 
Allison’s attempt to deduce a necessary relation between each schema and its category 
relies upon the insertion of a condition which points to memory. His article first stresses 
the importance of distinguishing between time as a form of inner sense and the significant 
temporal determinations effected by the schemata. Then he emphasizes that the key to 
understanding the schematism is paying heed to the fact that schemata are the products of 
transcendental imagination, and hence accomplish temporally determination. Finally, 
Allison invokes a condition of possibility for deducing the relation between category and 
schema which ‘obviously’ relies upon structures of memory, just as the relation between 
category and appearance does.
Conclusion: Conditions o f  Knowledge and Experience in a Temporally Ordered World:
After an analysis of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories, the 
transcendental unity of apperception was discovered to be the fundamental condition of
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all experience. Apperception was revealed, in turn, to depend upon the transcendental 
synthesis of pure, or productive, imagination. The previous chapter was devoted to 
establishing that productive imagination (as the synthesis of temporal unification which 
engenders the possibility for attributing objects to the same consciousness across time) is 
equally well considered as the necessary condition o f possibility for memory. In the 
concluding pages of the previous chapter (p.26) I wrote that ‘the productive imagination 
is also the mediating factor between these empirical representations and the unchanging 
structure of consciousness, transcendental apperception’. This was something of a 
necessary generalization which required an explication of the schematism to be made 
more specific and accurate. It is the schemata which, as the products o f  productive 
imagination, serve in the role of mediation. This mediation is between appearances 
(empirical representations) and the categories (as the a priori modes of knowledge in 
understanding, unified in virtue of transcendental apperception). The schema(ta) for each 
of the four categories is shown to be identical with the four necessary conditions for 
human memory: the past, content of the past/memory, the temporal ordering of this 
content, and the determination of the duration of this ordered content. The analysis of 
Norman Kemp Smith’s assessment o f the schematism shows us that Kant’s account 
becomes incomprehensible if we misunderstand, or even undervalue, the role of 
temporality. Further, this essential temporality is directed toward the past and memories 
thereof. Allison’s article shows us that attempts to elaborate upon Kant’s account of the 
schematism engender elaborations of the functioning of memory. His attempt to give a 
deduction of the relation between the schema, and the category, of substance led to the 
‘obvious’ condition of reidentifiability, which condition has an equally obvious ground in 
memory.
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Kant gives multiple articulations on what a schema actually is8, the most pertinent 
formulations for our purpose are those which most explicitly deal with the functioning of 
the schemata, first a schema is “a transcendental product of imagination, a product which 
concerns the determination of inner sense in general according to conditions of its form 
(time), in respect of all representations, so far as these representations are to be connected 
a priori in one concept in conformity with the unity of apperception” (CPR, B181/A142), 
and second, a schema consists of “the true and sole conditions under which these 
concepts obtain relation to objects and so possess significance” (CPR, B185/A146). I 
wrote in the introduction that human experience is characterised by temporality, our 
experiences have duration and always occur within time. Kant’s schematism is an 
attempt to show the possible relation between pure concepts of the understanding and 
appearances, and this is only possible in virtue of a mediating element which is primarily 
temporal, that is, an element which makes time determinations. This exposes the implicit 
project within the schematism that what is needed is not only a mediating element that 
makes knowledge of, and experience in, the world possible, but also that this knowledge 
and experience is possible within a world which is always a temporally ordered world for 
us.
So it is that, when Kant describes a schema as the only condition under which 
objects can have significance for us, we know that this significance is possible in virtue of 
the work of schemata, which is temporal determination. Further, these time 
determinations have the character of determinations of memory. Combining these 
considerations, we arrive at the conclusion that it is only in virtue of determinations of 
memory that objects can have significance for us. The world in which we live is,
8 cf Allison81, p66, where Allison finds no less than eight formulations.
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fundamentally, temporally ordered, and this order is possible in virtue of determinations 
of memory.
In the following chapter, an analysis of the principles of understanding (along 
with the axioms of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and 
postulates o f empirical thought) will reveal that Kant’s conditions o f intuition in space 
and time, as well as the determination of objects in relation to each other, equally depend 
upon, and prove the necessity of, determinations of memory and the transcendental 
ground thereof.
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Chapter Three:
Principles of Pure Understanding: Memory and Experiences:
Introduction:
In the previous two chapters, we have seen Kant’s attempts to establish, first the 
necessary structures of consciousness which make experience possible, and second, the 
mediating ground which allows for the relation of these structures to the external world as 
appearance. Both of these projects have been shown to be, not only temporal in nature, 
but to involve structures of memory as the ground of their possibility and employment. In 
the following chapter we find an explication of these themes in terms of necessary 
characteristics of actual experience as predicated upon structures of memory. It is with 
reference to the Principles of Understanding that we find the site for the most direct 
elaboration of memory as the fundamental constituent of experience as we know it.
Kant’s chapter, the Principles of Pure Understanding, is an attempt to demonstrate 
the judgments which understanding makes possible a priori. The Schematism chapter 
was intended to show the universal conditions of the application of pure concepts for 
synthetic judgments. For his task in the principles Kant continues to use the categories as 
his guide: “There can be no question that in this enquiry our table of categories is the 
natural and safe guide. For since it is through the relation of the categories to possible 
experience that all pure a priori knowledge of understanding has to be constituted, their 
relation to sensibility in general will exhibit completely and systematically all the
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transcendental principles of the use of the understanding” (CPR, A148/B188). Seeking to 
establish, as his primary purpose in the Critique, the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgments, Kant first elaborates upon synthetic judgments themselves, by means of a 
contrast with analytic judgments.
Analytic and Synthetic Judgments: the Possibility o f  (Objects of) Experience:
Kant gives the highest principles of analytic and synthetic judgments as, 
respectively, the principle o f contradiction, and the principle that “every object stands 
under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity o f the manifold of intuition in a possible 
experience” (CPR, B197/A158). Since analytic judgments only involve explications of 
the concept involved, an analytic judgment can only be either positive or negative; there 
is no question of relation to another concept. This being so, the principle of contradiction 
allows for all, which is to say both, possible analytic judgments: “If it is to be affirmative,
I ascribe to it [the concept] only what is already thought in it. If  it is to be negative I 
exclude from it only its opposite” (CPR, B193/A154). The matter is not so simple when 
it comes to synthetic judgments.
The principle o f contradiction is a necessary and sufficient condition of truth for 
analytic judgments, but is merely a necessary negative condition of synthetic judgments, 
and can never be sufficient for assessing the truth of these latter. This principle cannot 
give positive knowledge regarding the relation between concepts which are not internally 
related and so, this relation being the defining characteristic of synthetic judgments, 
cannot give positive knowledge of synthetic judgments. Synthetic judgments require a
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relation between a concept and something which is entirely distinct in thought from that 
concept.
Granted, then, that we must advance beyond a given concept in order to 
compare it synthetically with another, a third something is necessary, as that 
in wherein alone the synthesis o f two concepts can be achieved... There is 
only one whole in which all our all our representations are contained, 
namely, inner sense and its a priori form, time. The synthesis of 
representations rests on imagination; and their synthetic unity, which is 
required for judgment, on the unity of apperception. In these, therefore, [in 
inner sense, imagination, and apperception], we must look for the possibility 
of synthetic judgments; and since all three contain the sources o f a priori 
representations, they must also account for the possibility of pure synthetic 
judgments (CPR, B194/A155)
Since part of the project of the principles of understanding is a demonstration of the 
relation of the formal conditions of knowledge with experience in its actuality9, we shall 
also find the site of explication for my claim that the conditions of experience in a 
temporally ordered world are the conditions of memory. So it is appropriate here to 
remind the reader of how Kant’s three sources of possibility for synthetic judgments have 
been transformed in the course of this analysis. Time, as the form of inner sense, is the 
condition to which all appearances whatsoever are subject. This is not to be confused 
however, with either the temporality of lived experience (duration), or the time 
determinations accomplished by the schemata. Time as the form of inner sense assures 
that representations occur in time prior to any knowledge thereof; the schemata 
determine, by contrast, how, or the manner in which, objects occur in time as 
comprehensible elements of the temporal world.
The imagination which Kant references here is the reproductive, or empirical 
imagination as opposed to the productive, or pure, imagination. The reproductive
9 The Schematism demonstrated the relation of the formal conditions of knowledge with experience in its 
possibility and necessity.
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imagination relates to empirical representations: “Their [the concepts of space and time] 
representation is a mere schema which always stands in relation to the reproductive 
imagination that calls up and assembles the objects of experience” (CPR, B195/A156).
The schematism demonstrated the possibility of the relation between concepts and 
appearances, but Kant is pointing out here that it is the reproductive imagination which 
gathers together the appearances to be subsumed under a concept. There are two points 
here which need to be brought to the fore: the first is a reminder that the reproductive 
imagination is possible only in virtue of the temporal synthesis of the productive 
imagination, and the second is that the reproductive imagination can only ‘call up’ objects 
of experience from a past of experience. It is here that we find the introduction of 
empirical memory which has been thus far deferred. In our discussion of the 
Transcendental Deduction, the synthesis of pure, productive imagination was shown to be 
necessary precisely because the reproductive imagination relied upon empirical syntheses 
(the reproductive imagination is the synthesis of representations apprehended in 
intuition). In order for the reproductive imagination to ‘call up’ objects of experience, 
there must first be representations apprehended in intuition; the work of intuition is 
structurally prior to that of empirical imagination. In other words, the representations 
which reproductive imagination calls up are always already past, they must be 
apprehended before they can be organised by imagination. This is not to say all objects 
of experience are known as objects of the past, but there is a structural ordering at work in 
every level of the constitution of experience, and this ordering is always temporal (more 
on this below).
Finally in this triad of the possibility for synthetic judgments comes apperception.
In the analysis given of the Transcendental Deduction, it was shown that the primary
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importance of apperception is that a consciousness unified across different times is
necessary for the possibility of any representation whatsoever. A unified unchanging
structure o f consciousness (as opposed to empirical consciousness which is ever-
changing) is required for objects of intuition to be attributable to the same consciousness.
The synthetic unity of the manifold, and hence any possible experience, depends upon
this transcendental unity. However, in order for all of these syntheses not only to be
meaningful for a consciousness, but also to count as knowledge o f objects in the world,
representations must relate to actual or possible experience.
The possibility o f  experience is, then, what gives objective reality to all our a 
priori modes of knowledge. Experience, however, rests on the synthetic 
unity of appearances, that is, on a synthesis according to concepts of an 
object of appearances in general. Apart from such synthesis it would not be 
knowledge, but a rhapsody of perceptions that would not fit into any context 
according to rules of a completely interconnected (possible) consciousness, 
and so would not conform to the necessary unity of apperception.
Experience depends, therefore, upon a priori principles of its form, that is, 
upon universal rules o f unity in the synthesis of appearances. Their 
objective reality, as necessary conditions of experience, and indeed of its 
very possibility, can always be shown in experience. Apart from this 
relation synthetic a priori principles are completely impossible. For they 
have then no third something, that is, no object, in which the synthetic unity 
can exhibit the objective reality of its concepts.” (CPR, B195/A156- 
B196/A157)
Pure synthetic judgments, therefore, have objective validity only in virtue of their relation 
to possible experience. The reality of non-empirical syntheses is imparted to them by 
experience as empirical synthesis. In this way, a priori knowledge can be true (agree with 
its object) only as long as it contains that which is necessary for the synthetic unity of 
experience (CPR, B196/A157). This is why Kant gives the highest principle of synthetic 
judgment as the requirement that “every object stands under the necessary conditions of 
synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience”. Synthetic a priori 
judgments are possible as long as time as the form of inner sense, reproductive
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imagination, and apperception are related to a possible empirical knowledge, “we then 
assert that the conditions of the possibility o f experience in general are likewise 
conditions of the possibility o f  the objects o f experience, and that for this reason they have 
objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment” (CPR, B197/A158).
Mathematical and Dynamical Syntheses and the Principles ’ Relation to the Categories:
The principles are in fact the products of pure understanding, but they are the very 
rules according to which knowledge of objects are possible and so are not limited to pure 
intuitions, “the laws of nature, indeed, one and all, without exception, stand under higher 
principles of understanding” (CPR, B198/A159). For Kant, appearances and experience 
are the instantiations of these principles in so far as these principles provide the concept 
which serves as the condition of any and each appearance or experience of objects. Kant 
distinguishes two kinds of synthesis in the application of the pure concepts to experience: 
mathematical and dynamical. Using, once again, the categories as what Kant calls our 
‘natural guide’, the table of principles is divided in accordance with the table of 
categories, the first two of which are considered mathematical syntheses and the latter 
two, dynamical. The table of principles, in the order in which they correspond to the 
categories, are: I) Axioms of Intuition, II) Anticipations of Perception, III) Analogies of 
Experience, and IV) Postulates of Empirical Thought in General. The former two are 
considered mathematical because “the a priori conditions of intuition are absolutely 
necessary conditions of any possible experience”, rendering them immediately necessary 
(CPR, A160/B199). The latter two, however, as the conditions “of the existence of the
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objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves only accidental” (CPR, 
A160/B199). The dynamical employment of the syntheses is still a priori necessary, but 
only, as Kant calls it, mediately and indirectly, since they apply only “under the condition 
of empirical thought in some experience” (CPR, A160/B200). The Axioms and 
Anticipations then, correspond to the categories of Quantity (or, as it is understood after 
its treatment in the schematism, Magnitude), and Quality; these are the mathematical 
syntheses. The Analogies and Postulates correspond to the categories of Relation and 
Modality, respectively, and are the dynamical syntheses.
Now, in a note added in the B edition, Kant gives a series of definitions regarding
the various kinds of combinations performed by all of these syntheses. As the note is
quite concise, and the definitions given are integral to my project here, before proceeding
with the analysis of the principles of understanding, I shall reproduce the note here in full:
All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio) or 
connection {nexus). The former is the synthesis of the manifold where its 
constituents do not necessarily belong to one another. For example, the two 
triangles into which a square is divided by its diagonal do not necessarily 
belong to one another. Such also is the synthesis o f the homogeneous in 
everything which can be mathematically treated. This synthesis can itself be 
divided into that of aggregation and that o f coalition, the former applying to 
extensive and the latter to intensive quantities. The second mode of 
combination {nexus) is the synthesis of the manifold so far as its constituents 
necessarily belong to one another, as, for example, the accident to some 
substance, or the effect to the cause. It is therefore synthesis of that which, 
though heterogeneous, is yet represented as combined a priori. This 
combination, as not being arbitrary and as concerning the connection of the 
existence of the manifold, I entitle dynamical. Such connection can itself, in 
turn, be divided into the physical connection of the appearances with one 
another, and their metaphysical connection in the a priori faculty of 
knowledge. (CPR, B202)
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Axioms o f Intuition: Time-Magnitude and the Retentive Power o f  Memory:
In the analysis of the schematism of the categories, the concept of magnitude was 
shown to be the source of the generation of time itself, or the time in which appearances 
can be ordered. I equated this with the generation of the past itself; it is in virtue of the 
schema of magnitude that appearances are temporally determined, such that my past is, 
not only, known as mine, but known as past in a temporal succession. The axioms of 
intuition which correspond to this category show that this synthesis is indeed 
indispensable for our experience and knowledge of the world. The schematism 
demonstrated how appearances can be subsumed under a concept; the principles will 
show that these concepts are, in fact, the necessary conditions for the kinds of knowledge 
and experience we have.
Kant gives the principle of the axioms of intuition as follows: “All intuitions are 
extensive magnitudes” (CPR, A162/B202). All appearances contain an intuition in (space 
and) time. Empirical consciousness of appearances is possible only in so far as there is a 
synthesis of the manifold, that generates the space and time that determines 
representations. Consciousness of this synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition is the 
work of the concept of magnitude (CPR, A162/B203). Appearances are always extensive 
magnitudes since it is the generation of the synthetic unity of intuition (concept of 
magnitude) that makes the representation of appearances possible. As Kant writes: “As 
intuitions in space or time, they must be represented through the same synthesis whereby 
space and time in general are determined” (CPR, A126/B203). What makes appearances 
extensive, rather than intensive, magnitudes is their manner of combination (as per the 
note cited above). Appearances are composed according to aggregation, that is, the parts
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necessarily precede the whole’s representation. As Kant writes of times: “In these I think 
to myself only that successive advance from one moment to another, whereby through the 
parts of time and their addition a determinate time-magnitude is generated. ...only through 
successive synthesis of part to part in [the process of] its apprehension can it become 
known” (CPR, A163/B204).
We can easily see how this is an explication of the empirical ramifications for the
schematized categories. The schema of magnitude was the generation of the time-series,
or succession. I emphasised that this is also the generation o f the past itself, as a past
which could be known as mine. As this relates to empirical consciousness, we see that all
appearances, as subject to the forms of intuition, are also subject to the syntheses whereby
(space and) time become(s) comprehensible to us, that is, are determined10. The axioms
of intuition dictate that any appearance whatsoever, as containing the pure intuition of
either space or time, is an extensive magnitude, that is composed as an aggregate, through
the synthesis of parts, or moments, which necessarily precede the representation of the
whole. This successive synthesis which makes all appearance possible, is itself only
possible in virtue of the generation of a past in which the previous moment is retained
while those which succeed it are added. The representation of appearances is possible in
virtue of the work of memory which provides for the retention of moments to be
successively synthesized. This memory is transcendental since it is necessary for the
possibility of any experience whatsoever and is presupposed as the possibility for
empirical memory. The retentive work of memory preserves the components of the
10 In his discussion of the Axioms of Intuition Kant often emphasises the contrast of appearances containing 
the pure intuition of either space or time. This can give the misleading impression that the ‘or’ is exclusive 
and that it is possible for an appearance to contain the pure intuition of space and not time. We need only to 
remember here the assertion of the Transcendental Aesthetic, that space is the form of outer intuition, and 
time, as the form inner intuition, is also the form of all intuition. Kant separates the pure intuition of space 
in this section to allow for a natural progress to his discussion of geometry that follows.
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aggregate through time. This means that every appearance necessarily has its own 
duration, not only in terms of its degree of sensation (duration of our awareness of the 
appearance), but in its very constitution. Every appearance is possible in virtue of the 
duration given to it by memory; the span of retention in the generation of its time- 
magnitude. Kant writes “The synthesis of spaces and times, being a synthesis of the 
essential forms of all intuition, is what makes possible the apprehension of appearance, 
and consequently every outer experience and all knowledge of the objects of such 
experience” (CPR, B206/A166). However, we must remember that the form of time, as 
the form of outer and inner intuition, is the form of all intuition. Even those appearances 
which are represented through the synthesis of spaces must also be composed, in their 
aggregation, by the retentive work of memory. So that, for example, when Kant writes “I 
cannot represent to myself a line however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, 
generating from a point all its parts one after another” (CPR, A162/B203), it is also true 
that the representation of this line presupposes the retention of the beginning point as its 
successive parts are added. Appearances, as extensive magnitudes, are constituted by a 
successive synthesis which is accomplished by the retention of memory.
Anticipations o f  Perception: Sensation. Duration. Memory:
“The principle which anticipates all perceptions, as such, is as follows: In all 
appearances sensation and the real which corresponds to it in the object (realitas 
phaenomenori), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree” (CPR, A166). This is the 
formulation of the second principle which is given in the ‘A’ edition of the Critique. It is
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to be preferred over the second formulation given in the ‘B’ edition because it stresses 
that this principle refers to sensations. This is an essential point to bear in mind because it 
is through sensation that we are related to an object (the real) in so far as the conditions of 
human knowledge allow. The anticipations of perception provide the connection between 
empirical consciousness and the formal consciousness of the manifold o f space and time. 
Indeed, it is the addition of sensation to the pure intuition of space and time which yields 
empirical consciousness. However, whereas the axioms of intuition described the 
conditions under which any appearance could arise for human consciousness, and so 
described universal conditions of knowledge, sensation is a matter of subjective 
representation. As such, it gives us only “the consciousness that the subject is 
affected...which we relate to an object in general” (CPR, A166/B207). Kant is not here 
concerned with an enumeration of the possibly infinite number of sensations possible for 
an empirical subject, but rather with the principle that makes all sensations possible, and 
this principle is that of anticipation. To understand this we must return to the note on the 
different kinds o f combination (B202).
The axioms of intuition dealt with extensive magnitudes since appearances require 
a successive synthesis of their parts prior to their representation in intuition as a whole. 
Such is not the case with sensations: “sensation is not itself an objective representation, 
and since neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be met with in it, its 
magnitude is not extensive but intensive'''' (CPR, A166/B208). The synthesis involved in 
sensation is one of composition, like that of intuition, however, unlike intuition that 
composition is not of aggregates, but a synthesis of coalition. Kant asserts that we can 
think of sensation as being a continuum from empirical consciousness to pure 
consciousness: “a gradual transition is possible, the real in the former completely
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vanishing and a merely formal a priori consciousness of the manifold in space and time
remaining” (CPR, A166/B208). The reverse is also possible: a synthesis generates the
magnitude of a sensation from the zero point (no empirical content) up to any possible
magnitude of sensation. This synthesis (sensation) is instantaneous. It is not an
aggregation of parts across time, and this is why it is intensive rather than extensive. The
intensity refers also to what we could call the vividness, or affectiveness, o f the sensation.
“Corresponding to this intensity of sensation, an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree of
influence in the sense [i.e. on the special sense involved], must be ascribed to all objects
of perception, in so far as the perception contains sensation” (A166/B208). In any
sensation then, there is continuity between the greatest possible intensity of a sensation
and its diminution down to the point of its absence from the sense involved. Since the
intensity of sensation is a continuum, there is no part thereof which can be determined to
be the smallest. Further,
Space and time are quanta continua, because no part o f them can be given 
save as enclosed between limits (points or instants), and therefore only in 
such fashion that this part is itself again a space or a time. Space therefore 
consists solely of spaces, time solely of times. Points and instants are only 
limits, that is, mere positions which limit space and time. But positions 
always presuppose the intuitions which they limit or are intended to limit.
(CPR, A169/B211)
Just as Kant demonstrated in the Transcendental Aesthetic that time is not a property of 
things in themselves but a condition of all human experience, so here we find a deeper 
explication of this: time as a continuum is not itself intuited. We only ever experience 
‘times’, that is, delimited durations within the continuum, made apparent by the intuitions 
which serve as the limits or instants of that duration. Kant characterizes these magnitudes 
which serve to limit times as flowing, “since the synthesis of productive imagination
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involved in their production is a progression in time, and the continuity of time is 
ordinarily designated by the term flowing or flowing away” (CPR, A170/B212).
The reference back to the productive imagination at this point in Kant’s explanation is 
instructive; it is in virtue of the temporalizing synthesis of the productive imagination that 
the categories could be schematized according to the common ground of time. The 
schema of the category of quantity, to which the anticipations o f perception are intended 
to correspond, is time content, which I have shown to mean the content of memories. The 
schema of quality is the synthesis of sensation/perception with the representation of time, 
it is the filling of time with empirical content. Thus, the anticipations o f perception are 
principles of understanding that show how every appearance (in so far as it contains 
sensation) must conform to the condition of intensive magnitude; it must have a degree. 
This degree is characterized temporally by its instantaneity, it is the filling of time with 
instants of a certain intensity, and these instants serve to delimit the flow of time such that 
separate empirical ‘times’ can be known to us. This flow of time however, is only known 
by us in its very flowing away; empirical duration is comprehensible to us only in virtue 
of the instants which limit it, and one limiting instant must always be in the past, while 
the other can be either in the past or the present. If the duration is one which extends up 
to the present then, of the two limiting instants which bring experienced duration into 
relief against the flow of time, one shall be a limit in the past (as the beginning of the 
delimited duration) while the other shall be the present itself (as that temporal limit which 
experience can never progress beyond). The case is much easier when both limiting 
instants are in the past, for this would be a duration which has passed altogether, and so is 
not but a memory. This latter case makes the role of memory obvious in our knowledge 
of duration, but the former case equally relies upon the faculty of memory. Once again,
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this memory is a necessary principle of the understanding in experience for it is 
presupposed by every experience and empirical memory. Experience in and of the world 
is always characterized by temporality, and the temporality of experience (as both 
appearance and sensation) is constituted by duration. As such, every experience requires 
that at least one of the delimiting instants which make duration possible be in the past. As 
that faculty which preserves the past into the present, memory is necessary for the 
possibility o f experience.
Experience is not constituted by an uninterrupted progression through time of 
representations and sensations which begins when we become conscious and ends when 
we die. Experience is a repeating, overlapping, and relapsing process of navigating the 
manifold via the conditions of temporality which make experience possible. We do not 
experience time itself as an eternal continuum. Kant has shown us that the pure form of 
intuition cannot itself be intuited; rather, we experience objects in time, and it these very 
appearances which serve to delimit ‘times’ and render temporality comprehensible to us. 
As Kant writes:
All appearances, then, are continuous magnitudes, alike in their intuition, as 
extensive, and in their mere perception (sensation, and with it reality) as 
intensive. If the synthesis o f the manifold of appearance is interrupted, we 
have an aggregate of different appearances, and not appearance as a genuine 
quantum. Such an aggregate is not generated by continuing without break 
productive synthesis of a certain kind, but through repetition of an ever- 
ceasing synthesis. (CPR, A 170/B212)
The manifold of appearance is not a quantum because a quantum, as unified, is a 
continuum, and Kant’s point here is that there is a continuum of intensive (instantaneous) 
magnitudes in sensation, but that extensive magnitudes (composed through time) as 
generated by productive synthesis, are compositions of aggregates, not degrees within a
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continuum. Both are continuous, but while the intensive magnitudes serve to delimit 
empirical time as instants, extensive magnitudes are continuous in virtue of the repetition 
of synthesis of the manifold through time.
Experience of objects is possible in virtue of the duration of experience, and 
duration is constituted by delimiting instants. Appearances, as extensive magnitudes, are 
composed through time, but the intensity of the sensation thereof is instantaneous. The 
former magnitude refers to the extent of the appearance: its duration, complexity, quantity 
etc. The latter is that which delimits duration and makes it possible; it is the degree of 
intensity of sensation. In this way, “Intensive magnitude can in different appearances be 
smaller or greater, although the extensive magnitude of the intuition remains one and the 
same” (CPR, B214/A173). An extensive magnitude (appearance) need not necessarily 
change (in its extensity) in order for its intensity (as sensation) to alter by degree. It is 
this degree of intensity that is anticipated, by the understanding, in every perception. “All 
knowledge by means of which I am enabled to know and determine a priori what belongs 
to empirical knowledge may be entitled an anticipation” (CPR, A166/B208). What is 
anticipated is not the particular content of empirical consciousness, but rather that any 
empirical content, the real as sensation, will always have a degree of intensity. 
“Consequently, though all sensations as such are given only a posteriori, their property of 
possessing a degree can be known a priori” (CPR, A176/B218). What is anticipated is 
not the content of empirical consciousness but the synthesis which is always present in 
empirical consciousness, as its possibility. This synthesis, the possibility of empirical 
consciousness, is the faculty of memory as expressed in the retention of the beginning 
instant o f ‘a time’, or duration, as the sine qua non of experience.
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Analogies o f  Experience:
Kant gives the principle of the analogies of experience as follows: “Experience is 
possible only through representation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (CPR, 
B218). However, in the A edition of the Critique, we find another formulation that is 
more explicit in terms of the role of time: “All appearances are, as regards their existence, 
subject a priori to rules determining their relation to one another in one time” (CPR, 
A176). The former version of the principle stresses possibility of experience as a certain 
representation of perceptions, while the latter emphasises determination in time. We 
could combine the best aspects of both formulations of this principle and arrive a t : 
‘Experience is possible only in virtue of the a priori determination of perceptions in 
relation to one another in time’. The rules which shall give expression to this principle 
are deemed necessary because the perceptions of experience come to us in a completely 
contingent manner. That is, the perceptions themselves are not internally organised in 
relation to each other, and thus, on their own, could not constitute a coherent experience. 
This means that we need rules according to which perceptions are ordered in a coherent 
way for us. The ordering which the synthesis o f apprehension accomplishes is only a 
combining of the manifold of empirical intuition, and does not serve to order, a priori, 
these intuitions in terms of their relations to each other or myself. This, as was 
demonstrated by the schematism, requires a determination of their connection in time. 
However, “since experience is a knowledge of objects through perceptions, the relation 
[involved] in the existence of the manifold has to be represented in experience, not as it 
comes to be constructed in time but as it exists objectively in time” (CPR, B219). It may
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seem strange for Kant to write of something being represented ‘objectively’ in time since 
he has well established that time is an empirically real, but transcendentally ideal, 
subjective condition of human knowledge11. What Kant means by this is that, since time 
itself cannot be an object of perception, this temporal determination must take place in 
reference to time in general. That is, the determination of the existence of objects occurs 
with reference to the modes of time, rather than any empirical time. So it is that the 
Analogies of Experience relate back to the third category, that of Relation. Only concepts 
of the understanding can serve the role of grounding the rules which shall connect the 
existence of objects in time a priori (actually, it is the schematized concepts but more on 
this latter). So it is that, when Kant gives the three modes of time in which the three rules 
of necessary connection are to be found, they correspond to the three concepts under the 
category of relation: duration (Inherence and Subsistence), succession (Causality and 
Dependence), and coexistence (Community, or Reciprocity).
As a prelude to the actual analogies, Kant gives a summary of the two major 
temporal aspects of his account thus far, the unity of apperception, and the schematism. 
Kant points out that the analogies of experience depend upon the unity of apperception 
since “the original apperception stands in relation to inner sense (the sum of all 
representations), and indeed a priori to its form, that is, to the time-order of the manifold 
empirical consciousness” (CPR, A177/B220). The time relations of any conscious 
experience must be united in original apperception as the ground of productive 
imagination which, in turn, makes temporal syntheses possible. To remind the reader of 
our first chapter, all experience, in order to count as mine, must conform to the unity of
11 Incidentally, since time is the subjective condition for any human knowledge, it is a universal condition 
and hence is objectively valid for any community of human know ers despite the fact that time is not an 
attribute of things in themselves.
77
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
apperception. The analogies of experience are not concerned with the determination of 
the particular identity of undivided appearances, but only with their temporally 
determined existence itself, and their relation to one another in virtue of this temporality. 
So it is that “since existence cannot be constructed, the principles (of the analogies and 
the postulates) can apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only regulative 
principles” (CPR, A179/B222). These principles are to be contrasted with those of the 
axioms and anticipations, which were not merely regulative, but constitutive of objects.
These rules are entitles analogies because, as Kant defines analogies, they 
demonstrate the equality, not of two quantitative relations, but two qualitative relations. 
Kant explains that if “a perception is given in a time relation to some other perception, 
then even though this latter is indeterminate, and we consequently cannot decide what it 
is, or what its magnitude may be, we may none the less assert that in its existence it is 
necessarily connected with the former in time” (CPR, A179/B222). What the analogies 
accomplish is the a priori determination of empirical phenomena such that it can be 
attributed to the unity of apperception and thus be knowable as an experience of mine. 
“An analogy of experience is, therefore, only a rule according to which a unity of 
experience may arise from perception” (CPR, B222/A180). Since these rules deal with 
empirical perception, it follows that the categories involved must be the schematized 
categories as those which can subsume appearances under a concept. Since the analogies 
are regulative, rather than constitutive, we must bear in mind that they are valid as 
principles of the empirical, and not transcendental employment of the understanding 
(CPR, B223/A181). “In the principle itself we do indeed make use of the category, but in 
applying it to appearances we substitute for it its schema as the key to its employment, or 
rather set it alongside the category, as its restricting condition, and as being what may be
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called its formula” (CPR, A181/B224). This should not be surprising since the 
schematism demonstrated that only time can serve as the mediating factor for the 
subsumption of appearances under categories, and here we find the application of the 
rules which stem directly from this subsumption, as expressing the modes of time which 
render perceptions comprehensible to us.
First Analoev: Substance and the Past Itself:
In the discussion of the schematism, the schema of magnitude was the generation 
of time itself, time-series, which I demonstrated to be the condition o f possibility for the 
past itself as ground for the filling of time with temporally ordered experiences. The first 
analogy, the principle o f the permanence of substance, is the condition of the possibility 
of the past itself made actual in terms of human experience. We shall see that the first 
analogy establishes the ground of time in which past representations can be represented as 
past. In other words, the past of experience itself. Kant’s principle of the first analogy 
runs: “All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the 
transitory as its mere determination that is, as a way in which the object exists” (CPR,
A182). The manner in which we apprehend the manifold is ever changing and if there 
were not something unchanging with reference to which we could know the changing, the 
manifold could never be comprehensible to us as either successive or coexistent. All 
appearances are subject to the form of time, as the condition of inner sense, and are 
determined by time as the mediating ground for the application of concepts to 
appearances. Further, only in time can succession or coexistence (the two elements
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necessary for a coherent world) be represented. These considerations lead Kant to the 
assertion that “the time in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and 
does not change” (CPR, A182/B225). The successive and coexistent temporal aspects of 
our representations imply a substratum of permanence against which alteration can be 
known. All representations are determined as either successive or coexistent, “For such 
determination we require an underlying ground which exists at all times, that is, 
something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence are only so many 
ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists” (CPR, A182/B226). Since all 
representations are determined in relation to each other either by succession or 
coexistence, and these only two time relations presuppose a substratum of permanence, 
the conclusion is that all relations of time are possible in virtue of the permanent. “The 
permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself; in it alone is 
any determination of time possible” (CPR, B226/A183).
In the axioms of intuition, Kant demonstrated that every appearance has a duration 
as extensive magnitude, and I elaborated this point to show that every appearance is 
possible in virtue of the duration given to it by memory as the span of retention in the 
generation of its time-magnitude. What the first analogy contributes to the discussion of 
the possibility of knowledge and experience being structured upon memory is the past 
itself. What Kant does not make explicit in his assertion of the necessity for the 
permanence of substance, is that he is also describing the ground in which the time 
passes, but a ground that does not itself pass in time. In other words, there is a ground of 
time that does not pass in time. Kant comes closest to this ground when he writes “Only 
through the permanent does existence in different parts of the time-series acquire a 
magnitude which can be entitled duration. For in bare succession existence is always
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vanishing and recommencing, and never has the least magnitude” (CPR, B226/A183). 
Kant’s point here is that the permanent is necessitated as the ground against which 
duration can appear. However, as I wrote above, this duration is the work of memory in 
the retention of the instant which marks the beginning of the span of time that endures in 
our consciousness. Just as Kant points out that the alteration of appearances across time 
presupposes a permanent ground to render it comprehensible, so too the passage of 
instants or ‘times’ and durations presupposes a ground of temporal permanence against 
which this passage is possible and comprehensible. This temporal permanence is the past 
itself, not the past of the empirical representation of memories, but a permanent past 
which is the possibility for the consciousness of the passage of time, and the realm in 
which instants are retained and drawn from.
This permanent past through which time passes, but that does not itself pass is not 
a past of which we are consciously aware, for it is the possibility for our awareness of our 
empirical past. The past which we can know is to be thought of as a mode or 
determination of this permanent past, just as Kant writes “All existence and all change in 
time have thus to be viewed as simply a mode of the existence of that which remains and 
persists” (CPR, A183/B227). Substance, as the permanent, is not an object for empirical 
consciousness, but is presupposed as the condition for the kinds of experience human 
beings have. Existence and change must be ‘viewed’ as determinations of that which is 
permanent: substance. In explaining this understanding of the relationship between 
substance and appearance, Kant has recourse to time as a permanent ground but does not 
draw out the implications of this: “We can therefore give as appearance the title 
‘substance’ just for the reason that we presuppose its existence throughout all time, and 
that this is not adequately expressed by the word permanence, a term which applies
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chiefly to future time. But since the inner necessity of persisting is inseparably bound up 
with the necessity of always having existed,...” (CPR, A185/B229). What we can draw 
from this claim is that substance is a concept which is not forward, but backward looking 
in terms of temporality. Substance is not appropriately understood as pointing to the 
future in its enduring, but points back to a past in which it has always existed. Further, 
when Kant writes that, in substance, “we presuppose its existence throughout all time”, he 
cannot mean the empirical times of consciousness, for this is still at the level of finite 
delimited time as a subjective condition of human knowledge. What is intended by 
‘throughout all time’ must be that, in substance, we presuppose an existence in time 
which does not pass, in a time that does not pass. Further, this absolute time cannot refer 
to the future, for as Kant writes, what is required is a ground that always has existed. 
Neither could this substance refer to a temporality in the present, for a present which does 
not pass would negate the very possibility of experience as elaborated up to this point.
The ultimate foundation for human experience, the application of appearances to the same 
self across time, would be impossible since there would be no ‘across time’ and hence no 
possibility for such an application. This is why Kant prefers ‘substance’ to the forward 
looking ‘permanence’; it is retention and a pre-existing condition of determination that is 
needed. Indeed, when Kant discusses the coming to be of appearances, it is only with 
reference to the past that it is comprehensible. “But if we connect the coming to be with 
things which previously existed, and which persist in existence up to the moment of this 
coming to be, this latter must be simply a determination of what is permanent in that 
which precedes it” (CPR, B231/A188). The alteration of appearances presupposes the 
pre-existence of substance as the unchanging in appearance, but this pre-existence itself 
requires a ground of time as pre-existing the time in which successive alteration occurs.
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With the succession of different instants, or durations, we do not have time itself being 
succeeded by an altogether other time. This would be absurd and runs contrary to the 
very possibility of human experience as the synthetic unity of perceptions. There is a 
ground of time, an unchanging time, in which different instants and duration pass, and 
from whence they are retrieved by memory. This is why Kant writes (though without 
seeming to know the full implications thereof): “Permanence, as the abiding correlate of 
all existence of appearances, o f all change and of all concomitance, expresses time in 
general” (CPR, B226/A183). Time in general here, can refer not only to every 
determination of time, but also to time itself as the one unchanging ground for the 
possibility of these determinations. This sense of time is to be distinguished from, both, 
time as the form of inner sense and the experiential time determined by the schemata. It 
is my contentious claim that the permanent in relation to which any change is 
comprehensible is the past itself since all change occurs across time and hence is 
temporal. It follows that, just as physical change presupposes permanence, so too, if 
change is always temporal, it presupposes a temporal permanence. Further, Kant 
acknowledges that “There is only one time in which all different times must be located, 
not as coexistent but as in succession to one another” (CPR, B232/A189) but is missing 
the conclusion that this one time is the past itself. This past itself is not my past, or any 
empirical past, but a principle of the understanding which serves to render experience 
comprehensible to us.
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Second Analogy: Memory as the Possibility for the Present:
Having established the first analogy of experience, regarding the permanence of 
substance, and the concomitant understanding of alteration, it now befalls Kant to give an 
account of the coherent ordering of this alteration among representations. Once it is 
understood that alteration is the changing of appearances (substance being necessarily 
permanent), it becomes apparent that succession is in need of deeper determination.
It is a fact of experience that things change, not only particular objects but states 
of affairs, or events. Indeed, experience itself can be seen as nothing other than the 
awareness of this succession of events. Now, it is not the case that we experience one set 
of events and then another without any connection between them. This could be thought 
of as bare succession, or a simple alteration between two states of affairs, but experience 
works in such a way that the succession from one event to another occurs in a coherent 
fashion. Not only this, but the very ordering of the succession occurs in such a 
determinate way that its opposite seems inconceivable to us. That is, not only is there a 
coherence to the succession from one event to another, but that this event followed from 
that one, (and not the reverse) seems to us to be an equally necessary component of the 
experience. The coherence of this transition or succession is precisely what is at issue in 
Kant's second analogy of experience.
The principle given in the B edition for the second analogy is entitled the principle 
of succession in time, in accordance with the law of causality, and is given thus: “All 
alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect” 
(CPR, B232). However, the A edition is entitled the principle of production, and runs: 
“Everything that happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it
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follows according to a rule” (CPR, A189)12. Kant points out that this strict determination 
of one event as following another with necessity, cannot be located in the object for all 
we know of the object is appearance, nor can our knowledge of such a relation between 
states of affairs be derived from experience because then it would be merely an induction 
and could not have the form of necessity with which it is imbued. The pure concepts of 
the understanding are the only concepts capable of providing determinations which give 
necessity to a synthetic unity such as the relation of succession between two states. 
Causality, of course, would be the concept of the understanding which would render 
possible a determinate relation between two states such that one followed another 
necessarily.
Citing causality as the source of the coherence of successive states in experience 
still does not solve all of the problems, however. We still require an account of how it is 
that this relationship can have objective validity since it appears to be grounded in a 
merely subjective condition for human experience. It is determination in time, 
specifically with reference to the past, that our representations can have objective validity.
... appearance never goes back from the succeeding to the preceding point of time, 
though it does indeed stand in relation to some preceding point of time. The advance, on 
the other hand, from a given time to the determinate time that follows is a necessary 
advance. Therefore, since there certainly is something that follows [i.e. that is 
apprehended as following], I must refer it necessarily to something else which precedes it 
and upon which it follows in conformity with a rule, that is, of necessity. The event, as 
the conditioned, thus affords reliable evidence of some condition, and this condition is 
what determines the event. CPR, B239/A194.
In so far as all knowledge involves a synthesis of the manifold on the part of 
imagination, these syntheses shall necessarily succeed one another in time; however, the 
particular ordering of these syntheses is what determines the very object as such. The
12 the implications of these different formulations shall be discussed in what follows.
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ordering relationship, grounded in the concept of causality, is a constituting aspect of the 
object as a determinate object for experience. The concept of causality then, as a 
subjective condition of human knowledge, is seen to already have its determinate 
relationship with the object, since it is integral to the very constitution of the object as 
such.
Kant here refutes the Humean view that the concept of causality is first known to 
us only through repeated exposure to a particular effect following from a particular cause, 
that is, that it is empirically inferred. This would render the rule of successive 
determination merely empirical and not necessary and a priori as Kant demonstrates. The 
experience of causation presupposes a necessary temporal ordering in the synthesis of 
perceptions. Further, experience, as characterised by succession, does not only afford 
evidence of the concept of causality as an a priori condition of experience, but also of this 
conditioning concept itself expressing memory. The determination of an object as 
referring back in time to a preceding state is not merely an implied structure of 
consciousness, but describes how it is that we actually know and experience the world. 
This means that we are aware of the relation the event bears to its conditioning, preceding 
state. That is, we remember the preceding state which conditions the event in the present. 
Indeed, it is only because of this experiential memory that the event can be delimited as 
its own event, and be known in its temporal position with reference to another event 
which it succeeds. “When, therefore, I perceive that something happens, this 
representation first of all contains [the consciousness] that there is something preceding, 
because only by reference to what precedes does the appearance acquire its time-relation, 
namely, that of existing after a preceding time in which it itself was not” (CPR, 
B243/A198). The move from subjective apprehension to objectively valid meaning in
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our representations is accomplished in virtue of a rule of the understanding that employs 
memory in order to determine objects in an objectively valid time-series. The present as 
we know it, the only way in which we can know it, is conditioned by the past through the 
work of an implicit memory. The present is constituted by memory in relation to the past, 
or: “the present, so far as it has come to be, refers us to some preceding state” (CPR, 
B244/A199). As a formal condition of perception, this rule becomes a law of empirical 
representation; namely, “that the appearances of past time determine all existences in the 
succeeding time, and that these latter, as events, can take place only in so far as the 
appearances of past time determine their existence in time” (CPR, B244/A199). While 
we need not be consciously aware of this temporal determining act, there must be a form 
of memory at work in order, not only, to retain the preceding state that accomplishes the 
determining, but to retain it as relevantly engaged in the very production of our 
consciousness of the present, that is, o f experience. This determining retention of 
memory is a necessary constituent of experience and so precedes any actual experience, 
however, it is possible to bring this determination of memory to the level of the empirical, 
that is, to conscious awareness. This awareness is not of the structure of functioning of 
the determination of memory, but of the product of the principle. This is the basis for 
Hume’s claim: we can look back on past experiences and infer empirical rules of 
causation about the world. This empirical inference requires empirical memory but is 
possible only in virtue of the temporal determinations made possible by transcendental 
memory.
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Third Analogy: Memory and the Actuality o f Experience:
The third analogy of experience deals with the coexistence of appearances and has 
as its principle: “All substances, in so far as they can be perceived to coexist in space, are 
in thoroughgoing reciprocity” (CPR, B258). Objects are considered to coexist when our 
perception of them in empirical intuition does not have a determinate temporal ordering 
to which our perceptions are necessarily beholden. In other words, the order in which I 
perceive A and B can readily be reversed. Now, the synthesis of reproductive (empirical) 
imagination allows for the apprehension of appearances successively but does not 
determine them as, either, necessarily in sequence (this is what the productive 
imagination and the category of causality accomplish) or necessarily coexisting. For 
coexistence is accomplished via the principle o f reciprocity as the application of the 
concept of community. Without this principle, the perception of appearances as 
coexistent would be merely subjective and could not have the objective validity given it 
by a necessary condition of human experience. This is equivalent to saying that “the 
reciprocal sequence is grounded in the object, and so to represent the coexistence as 
objective” (CPR, A211/B258). If this reciprocity is grounded in the object then there 
must be mutual interaction between objects and the relation thereof is one of reciprocity 
or community in coexistence. To claim that things coexist is to claim that they coexist in 
time, or that they exist at the same time. The question then becomes: How can we know 
if they exist at the same time? Kant’s reply to this question is that “We do so when the 
order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is a matter of indifference” (CPR, 
A211/B258). This order was necessarily determined (not a matter of indifference) in the 
case of causation, for the cause was seen to determine, and precede, the effect. We
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cannot change the order of our perceptions such that we perceive first the effect and then 
the cause (as they occurred). This should be possible when two objects coexist and do 
not determine each other according to sequence, but mutually determine each other in 
reciprocity.
In order to deduce this reciprocity as necessary, Kant supposes its opposite and 
shows that the absence of this principle of the understanding renders experience 
impossible. If, in the manifold, each appearance does not act upon every other 
simultaneous appearance but stands alone, then every appearance would be separated 
from every other by empty space. If this were the case, then it would follow that “their 
coexistence would not be an object of a possible perception and that the existence of one 
could not lead by any path of empirical synthesis to the existence of another” (CPR, 
A212/B259). Even presupposing that we could have perceptions of each appearance 
separately, it would be impossible (in the absence of the concept o f community) to 
determine whether one perception follows upon another or is coexistent with it. Since all 
possible perceptions, as necessarily related to time as the form of inner sense, must be 
determined in time (and the only possible determinations in time are either as successive 
or as coexistent), an experience of coexistent objects would be impossible without the 
determination of reciprocity. There could not be a unified manifold of appearances 
coexisting for human experience. “In our mind, all appearances, since they are contained 
in possible experience, must stand in community (communio) of apperception, and in so 
far as the objects are to be represented as coexisting in connection with each other, they 
must mutually determine their position in one time, and thereby constitute a whole”
(CPR, A214/B261).
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This is all well and good, but it is not immediately clear how this analogy ties into 
the discussion of memory as a necessary structure of human experience. The third 
analogy deals primarily with relations of perceptions in space, albeit within one time as 
simultaneous. Nevertheless, the presence of memory shall make itself felt in its role of 
constituting the present through retention of the past. For, as Kant writes: “the present, so 
far as it has come to be, refers us to some preceding state” (CPR, B244/A199). This is 
still true in the case of coexisting object of perception. The turning of our attention from 
object A to object B (while it is possible, in virtue of their coexistence, to reverse the 
order of perception) still takes time. That is, the coexistence of objects does not make our 
perception of any two of them simultaneous in the act of perceiving. In the second 
analogy the determining work of memory in constituting the present was necessary, in the 
third analogy, its particular temporal ordering of perceptions is contingent but that 
memory constitutes the present is still essential. The principle of coexistence ensures the 
possibility that objects can be known as coexistent but our empirical experience of this 
coexistence occurs only in virtue of the retention of memory. To use Kant’s example, I 
can direct my perception first to the moon, then to the earth, or vice versa. Now, the 
principle of coexistence makes it a condition of experience that these perceptions are in 
reciprocal relation to each other such that I can know them as coexistent. However, it is 
only in virtue of memory, in conjunction with this principle, that I retain the perception of 
the moon once I look to the earth and know that I can once again turn my attention to the 
moon without wondering if it has disappeared. In other words, the experience in the 
present of turning my attention, from the moon, to the earth is constituted by the past 
moment of perceiving the moon, and it is this mnemonic constitution of experience that
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allows me to have knowledge of the coexistence of earth and moon. What the principle 
of coexistence makes possible fo r  experience, memory makes actual in experience.
Postulates o f  Empirical Thought:
The fourth and final installment of the principles of the understanding is the 
postulates of empirical thought. These postulates correspond to the category of Modality, 
and hence deal with possibility, actuality, and necessity. The postulates are given as 
follows: “1. That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the 
conditions of intuition and of concepts, is possible. 2. That which is bound up with the 
material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual. 3. That which in its 
connection with the actual is determined in accordance with universal conditions of 
experience (that is, exists as) necessary” (CPR, A218/B266). There is little in the 
explanation of the postulates that sheds light upon our topic here. However, for the sake 
of clarity I shall show how the points we have established thus far relate to Kant’s 
postulates.
In elaborating upon the formal conditions of human experience we have found 
that time is the form of all intuition, as the form of inner sense. Further, in the first 
chapter I explained that it is the temporal synthesis accomplished by the productive 
imagination that renders experience possible as necessarily relating to the transcendental 
unity of apperception. The temporal synthesis of the productive imagination was shown 
to have the structure of memory such that it is the retention and attribution of 
representations to the same consciousness across time. This is the fundamental
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possibility for experience. Additionally, in the second chapter, I demonstrated that the 
application of concepts to appearances (schematism) is possible only in virtue of a 
common ground, and that this mediating element is not only time (as Kant asserts), but 
the past. The past as mediating element in the application of the categories presupposes 
the work of memory. We can thus rework Kant’s first postulate to read ‘That which 
agrees with the formal conditions o f experience, that is, with the conditions of time as the 
form o f inner sense, the productive imagination, and the past as ground o f  the 
schematized categories, is possible.’
The second postulate deals with the material conditions of experience, or 
sensation. In the present chapter we have found that every sensation has an extensive and 
intensive magnitude. The extensive magnitude, the duration of sensation, presupposes the 
retentive work of memory, for the beginning point (and any point thereafter) of any 
duration must be retained in order to synthesize succession into the coherence of duration 
in sensation. Further, Kant demonstrated that intensive magnitudes serve to delimit 
empirical time as instants. It is this intensive magnitude which is anticipated in every 
sensation, and this anticipation of an intensity is what provides the beginning instant for 
the constitution of the duration of sensation. This synthesis is the faculty of memory as 
expressed in the retention of the beginning instant of ‘a time’, or duration. Extensity in 
sensation is the awareness of a duration and implies an active application of memory 
(though not necessarily a conscious application). Intensity of sensation, as anticipation, 
presupposes memory for the possibility of an actual sensation as the constitution of 
duration in virtue of intensive instants of which the duration is composed. We can thus 
rephrase the second postulate: ‘That which is bound up with the material conditions of 
experience, that is with the intensive and extensive retention o f  memory in sensation, is
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actual'. The third postulate refers to that which is bound to the universal and necessary 
conditions of experience in its actuality: necessity. This postulate is tautological once the 
previous two have been established and contributes nothing to the topic at issue here, and 
so I shall proceed to the next section, a discussion of the possible distinction between 
subjective and objective time.
George and the Problem o f  Memory’s Absence:
In the article “Van Cleve and Kant’s Analogies”, Rolph George is concerned with 
finding a defensible position for Kant’s proof in the second analogy of the Principles.
The major problem, which he views to be in need of surmounting, is the ordering of 
subjective time. George distinguishes between objective time, as the time determination 
of appearances within the time series, from subjective time, or time as the succession of 
inner apprehensions.
The first difficulty I find in this article is George’s assertion that “in subjective 
apprehension there is no duration, only succession of ideas” (George, 205). In support of 
this claim, George cites fragments of the first analogy which, for the sake of the 
exposition of George’s position, I shall reproduce exactly as he does: “Our apprehension 
of the manifold o f appearances is always successive, and is therefore always changing... 
But only through the permanent does existence in different parts of the time-series 
acquire a quantity called duration. For in mere succession by itself existence is always
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vanishing and starting, and never has the least magnitude (A182/B225f)” (George, 20513). 
George draws two inferences from this quotation. The first is that ‘mere succession’ is 
not time, and the second seems to be that mere succession refers here to subjective 
apprehension. For the first inference, it is a small matter to agree that mere succession is 
not time, if we mean that mere succession and duration are not identical. This point is the 
very subject of the first analogy. Concerning the second inference of George’s assertion,
I cannot be as readily accommodating. In order to clarify both George’s position and my 
own, I shall cite some of the missing parts of the fragment. The passages in bold indicate 
those which are not found in the article.
Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always changing. Through it 
alone we can never determine whether this manifold, as object of experience, is 
coexistent or in sequence. For such determination we require an underlying ground 
which exists at all times, that is, something abiding and permanent, of which all 
change and coexistence are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the 
permanent exists... Only through the permanent does existence in different parts of the 
time-series acquire a magnitude which can be entitled duration. For in bare succession 
existence is always vanishing and recommencing, and never has the least magnitude. 
Without the permanent there is therefore no time-relation.” CPR, A182/B226- 
A183/B227.
The thrust of this passage is now made clear to be the position of Kant’s that any time- 
determination requires substance (as the permanent). Now George equates ‘mere’, or 
bare, succession with the succession of ideas in inner apprehension. However, the 
passage just cited explains that succession and coexistence can only be determined as 
distinct in virtue of the underlying ground of permanence. It follows then, that there is 
not such a thing as bare, or ‘mere’ succession (at least not that could be known as such). 
If we return to George’s equation of bare succession with inner apprehension, we are 
forced, on this model, to claim either that inner apprehension is impossible, or that it
13 George is using his own translation of the Prussian Academy version of the Critique of Pure Reason.
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could never be an object of knowledge or experience. But let us follow George further 
into his attempt to solve this problem of two ‘times’.
In his elaboration of this problem between objective, or physical, time and 
subjective time, George turns to the second analogy. He gives his own analogy which is 
very instructive for my own purposes. I shall reproduce it in full:
As noted, the relation of succession as defined over the moments of 
physical time, is connected. The same does not hold for subjective time, 
since the order of arbitrarily chosen mental events from my past is not 
directly evident to me. How can this order be introduced? Entertain this 
analogy: Suppose that Adam, on his fifth day, wanted to arrange the 
preceding four in a temporal series, the days being held in his memory as 
separate stories, interrupted by sleep. He can introduce the desired order if 
he has a sufficient repertoire of causal connections acquired within the four 
days, if he knows that buds come before flowers, that leaves turn from green 
to yellow, and the like. He will invoke the principle propter hoc ergo post 
hoc. If he went to sleep on one of the days observing a bud, and awoke to a 
flower, he can infer their order. If a putative day does not fit in, he will set it 
aside as dream or hallucination.
At the beginning of the Second Analogy Kant speaks of the reversibility in 
the series o f apprehensions of a house, and irreversibility when a ship is seen 
drifting down a river (A190/B235f). This is not a preliminary version of his 
argument, but establishes a premiss [sic.] of it: If it is not possible to discern 
particular irreversible series in subjective time, the propter hoc ergo post 
hoc method can’t get started. Kant therefore, first of all, distinguishes 
irreversible series from the apprehension of static objects. George, 206-7.
I would like to begin by pointing out two things: the first is that there has been a shift 
from a discussion of the succession of ideas to a discussion of memories, and the second 
is that I find it encouraging for, and indicative of, the importance of my task here that 
George turns to a discussion of memory in an attempt to better explain Kant’s theory of 
time (though George himself makes no note of the introduction of memory as especially 
important in itself). On George’s account, Adam can be successful in his project of 
ordering his previous four days only if he has a ‘sufficient repertoire of causal
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connections’. These are empirical rules for the succession of appearances, as in the 
example of flowers following from buds. On this account then, our past can be ordered 
only through a conscious effort on our part that involves the application of ‘acquired’ 
rules for the succession of appearances and their instantiation. It should be apparent at 
this point that George is presupposing a temporal ordering in order for their to be 
memories, known as past experiences, which Adam then attempts to organise in the order 
in which they occurred.
The formation of the present, especially a present of remembering the past, is 
constituted by the past, and so it is more appropriate to write: ‘the causal connections 
established by those four days’, than ‘within these four days’. Adam does not (or not 
only) require a ‘causal repertoire’ in order to temporally order his memories. The 
memories, in a very strong sense, have been pre-ordered. The present is constituted by 
the past and the past thus reasserts itself in every present. The ordering of experiences 
does not require conscious effort in the present, this work is accomplished by memory. 
Why then should these events (once constituted by memory) need conscious formulation 
when they have become past? The inference of order from awakening to find a flower 
where once was a bud, presupposes the very synthesis o f memory which George deems to 
require conscious assistance after the fact.
In the discussion of the first analogy we saw that substance, as the permanent, is 
the past itself; that through which time passes, but which does not itself pass or change.
In the second analogy, Kant writes that: “the present, so far as it has come to be, refers us 
to some preceding state” (CPR, B244/A199). From this we learned that “When, 
therefore, I perceive that something happens, this representation first of all contains [the 
consciousness] that there is something preceding, because only by reference to what
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precedes does the appearance acquire its time-relation, namely, that of existing after a 
preceding time in which it itself was not” (CPR, B243/A198). The move from subjective 
apprehension to objectively valid meaning in our representations is accomplished in 
virtue of a rule of the understanding that employs memory in order to determine objects 
in an objectively valid time-series. This occurs in the very constitution of the present, it is 
not an empirically derived rule which comes to be applied after experience, memory is 
already implicit before any event becomes past; the present is constituted by memory in 
relation to the past. What this means is that there is a temporal ordering that must occur 
before any event or experience can be known as such. The ordering of our past is not 
possible because we recollect empirical instantiations of causation, our present is already 
imbued with a temporal determination accomplished by the past, before it ever becomes 
past. An understanding of the role which memory plays at the very outset of any 
constitution of experience dissolves the need for the kind of solution which George puts 
forward in his article, for it dissolves the problem that this solution is designed to address. 
The issue of the relation of subjective time to an objective time is a non-issue on the 
model of the past and memory here elaborated.
Summation:
Kant’s goal in the Principles o f the Understanding is to demonstrate how and what 
a priori knowledge is possible, “For since it is through the relation of the categories to 
possible experience that all pure a priori knowledge of understanding has to be 
constituted, their relation to sensibility in general will exhibit completely and
97
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
systematically all the transcendental principles of the understanding” (CPR, A148/B188). 
Having discussed the formal conditions of knowledge, and the possibility for the 
application of these conditions to objects, we have now endeavoured to discover the 
instantiation of these conditions in experience. The main aspects of these instantiation, as 
the possibility of experience as we know it, were the axioms of intuition, the anticipations 
of perception, and the analogies of experience. Through an analysis of the axioms we 
discovered that the representation of appearances is possible in virtue of the work of 
memory which retains moments to be successively synthesized. The retentive work of 
memory preserves the components of an aggregate through time. Successive synthesis 
yields the duration of experiences without which no delimited experience would be 
possible. We know the events of our lives in terms of durations, both as we experience 
these events and as we remember them. To reassert my earlier example: it is not 
necessary for me to remember my entire life from my tenth birthday up to the present, 
simply in order to remember my tenth birthday. This is because there is a duration to 
events and memories; my memory of my tenth birthday itself is composed of fragments 
of smaller events within that day (cutting the cake, playing hide and seek. . .). However, 
waking up the day after my birthday is not included in this memory. The memory of this 
day actually begins with cutting the cake because it was then, with all eyes on me, that I 
was intensely aware of the number of people that were there. This intensive moment 
marks the beginning of the memory’s duration and is what Kant meant by an intensive 
magnitude. The intensity of sensation is what demarcates moments of experienced time 
for us. It is in virtue of this demarcation that duration is possible, for there must be a 
starting and finishing point to duration14. Every experience requires that at least one of
14 This is not to say that these demarcations are fixed once and for all. We are all well aware that memories
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the delimiting instants which make duration possible be in the past. As that faculty which 
preserves the past into the present, memory is the possibility for the duration of 
experience.
In the first Analogy of experience we found that what Kant describes as substance 
is a permanent past through which time passes, but that does not itself pass. It is not a 
past of which we are consciously aware, for it is the possibility for our awareness of our 
empirical past. The past which we can know is to be thought of as a mode or 
determination of this permanent past. It is only in reference to the permanent that change 
can be comprehensible, so too the determination of the present by the past (as 
demonstrated in the second analogy) implies that the past pre-exists the present.
However, it is absurd to suppose that the past which the present shall become pre-exists 
itself. The past which pre-exists every present is the past in general, or the past itself as 
the ground of permanence for the knowledge of empirical pasts and that through which 
the present passes, as determined by an empirical past. This determination is the subject 
of the second analogy: the principle of succession in time in accordance with the law of 
causality. Here Kant demonstrates that every object points back to a preceding state. The 
determination of an object as referring back in time to a preceding state is not merely an 
implied structure of consciousness, but describes how it is that we actually know and 
experience the world. This means that we are aware of the relation the event bears to its 
conditioning, preceding state. That is, we remember the preceding state which conditions 
the event in the present. “When, therefore, I perceive that something happens, this 
representation first o f all contains [the consciousness] that there is something preceding,
can change in terms of clarity and content. Also, the present, as discussed earlier in relation to the 
anticipations, can serve as the finishing point of a duration; this is how an experience of the present is 
possible.
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because only by reference to what precedes does the appearance acquire its time-relation, 
namely, that of existing after a preceding time in which it itself was not” (CPR, 
B243/A198). The temporality of subjective apprehension acquires an objective meaning 
in our representations in virtue of memory determination of objects in an objectively valid 
time-series. This is what renders George’s problem with subjective time a non-problem. 
He introduces memory into the equation too late, and only in its empirical employment.
An understanding of the temporal structures at work in the very constitution of experience 
reveals memory to always already be involved. It is because the constitution of 
experience in the present is accomplished by memory, that temporal ordering in the past 
is possible. However, as the third analogy demonstrates, this does not mean that memory 
is not also at work in our experience of the present while it is still present. The 
representation of the manifold as a whole requires a rule for representing objects as 
coexisting, or simultaneous. All objects of experience are determined in time and there 
are only two means of determination: successive or coexistence. Those objects which are 
causally related are determined as successive, while those are determined to coexist that 
are in a relation of community or reciprocity. When objects are related by succession, it 
is impossible for our perception of the effect to precede that of the cause. With 
reciprocity, however, we may turn our attention from one object to another (and back 
again) in whichever order we list. This is, in fact, how we encounter the world at large in 
our everyday lives. When crossing the street, for example, we can look up the street for 
oncoming traffic, and then look down the street for traffic. What is important to note here 
is that, i) it is possible to look down the street then up the street, and ii) you need not 
check the same direction twice15. The principle of coexistence makes it a condition of
15 depending of course on the speed of traffic and visibility.
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experience that the perceptions of ‘up’ and ‘down’ the street are in reciprocal relation to 
each other such that I can know them as coexistent. However, it is only in virtue of 
memory, in conjunction with this principle, that I retain the perception of traffic being 
clear up the street once I look down the street. I know that I can turn my attention back 
up the street without wondering if it has disappeared but, provided I had a good view, this 
is unnecessary. I know I have already checked that direction for traffic and that the state 
o f ‘being devoid of traffic’ for that direction coexists with the same state in the opposite 
direction. In other words, the experience in the present of turning my attention, from one 
direction of traffic to the other is constituted by the past moment of perception, and it is 
this mnemonic constitution of experience that allows me to have knowledge of the 
coexistence of both directions of traffic being clear. As I wrote above: ‘What the 
principle of coexistence makes possible fo r  experience, memory makes actual in 
experience. ’
So it is that memory makes possible experience as it is known in its main 
characteristics: the constitution of duration in its extensity and intensity, experience as 
present in virtue of the determination of the past, and the possibility for a unified 
manifold of perceptual experience.
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Conclusion
In what has preceded, we have followed Kant through his attempts to establish the 
necessary structures for human experience, the possibility for the application of these 
structures to the external world, and the instantiation of these structures in experience 
itself. Beginning with the deduction of the categories, Kant emphasized the absolute 
importance of having a unified consciousness as the ground for the possibility of a priori 
knowledge. Experience, for Kant, can only count as such if we are conscious of it. The 
three syntheses encountered in the deduction serve to unify representations for 
consciousness, but this is not enough. Empirical consciousness has as its content an ever- 
changing array of phenomena, an unchanging unified consciousness is required as the 
ground for this fluctuating consciousness. This ground is the transcendental unity of 
apperception. This unchanging consciousness is of the utmost importance for Kant 
because this is the only way that objects can count as intuited by the same consciousness. 
In other words, since experience is only possible if we are conscious of it, there must be a 
stability to consciousness such that this awareness is possible by the same consciousness 
across time. This stability finds its ground in the transcendental unity of apperception. 
Only in virtue of a structure of consciousness that remains the same through time, can 
there be a coherent attribution of intuitions to a knowing subject. As Kant writes: “it is 
precisely because I ascribe every perception to one consciousness that I can say of each 
perception that I am conscious of it” (CPR, A122). The synthesis which renders possible 
the attribution of perceptions to this unified consciousness is the productive imagination.
It is obvious that the main concern of the deduction of the categories is the attribution of 
perceptions to the same consciousness across time. This means that the productive
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imagination must be temporal in its functioning; it is to relate perceptions that occur 
within time to a unified consciousness which remains the same across time. What is 
being described here is a transcendental structure of memory. It is a structure of memory 
because it ascribes perceptions in time to the same consciousness across time, not only 
this, but as Kant stresses, productive imagination ascribes them as belonging to that 
consciousness. This structure of memory is transcendental because it is a necessary 
universal a priori structure that makes reproductive imagination/empirical memory 
possible, and is the possibility for temporality while it is itself extra-temporal. The extra­
temporality of the productive imagination is best exemplified in the schema of magnitude, 
or time-series.
The goal of the schematism is to demonstrate how appearances can be subsumed
under a concept. This task requires a mediating ground which is seen to be a
“transcendental determination of time” (CPR, B177/A138). The transcendental synthesis
of productive imagination (what I call the transcendental structure of memory), is a
ground for the rules of the association of appearances. When Kant is introducing the
productive imagination, he describes its necessity as follows:
There must, therefore, be an objective ground (that is, one that can be 
comprehended a priori, antecedently to all empirical laws of the 
imagination) upon which rests the possibility, nay, the necessity, of a law 
that extends to all appearances -  a ground, namely, which constrains us to 
regard all appearances as data of the senses that must be associable in 
themselves and subject to universal rules of a thoroughgoing connection in 
their reproduction. CPR, A 122
The schemata are time-determinations which render possible the subsumption of 
appearances under concepts in four determinate ways corresponding to the four categories 
of the understanding. The first of these is the schema of magnitude, and is characterised
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by Kant as “a unity due to my generating time itself’ (CPR, B182/A143). I elaborated 
upon this point to show that the generation of time itself as successive is fundamental for 
knowledge of a past which is my past. The schema of magnitude is a temporal 
determination (like every schema), one that allows for the attribution of a past to the same 
consciousness across time. That is, the generation of time itself amounts to the generation 
of the passage of time as belonging to a specific consciousness, namely mine. The time 
that is generated is not the future, this would be inconceivable, but time as successive, 
which means time as the passage of the present into the past. This is why the generation 
of time itself, must be thought o f as the generation of a past which is meaningful for 
consciousness.
Now, to return to the question of the extra-temporality of the transcendental 
structure of memory. The productive imagination, which I equate with this structure of 
memory for reasons given above, is described by Kant as the ground of the universal rules 
which govern appearances. The temporal determinations o f the schemata are just such 
universal rules according to which the subsumption of appearances under concepts 
becomes possible. As Kant writes: “The schema is in itself always a product of 
imagination” (CPR, B179/A140), and further, “the schema of sensible concepts, such as 
figures in space, is a product and as it were, a monogram, of pure a priori imagination, 
through which and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible” 
(CPR, B181/A142). The schemata are always products o f the productive 
imagination/transcendental memory, they presuppose transcendental memory as their 
ground. We can think back to the distinction between productive and reproductive 
imagination made in the deduction of the categories. The reproductive imagination is a 
synthesis which determines the connections between empirical representations for
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empirical consciousness. This is an empirical synthesis since it requires appearances as 
the matter which is reproduced. The synthesis of the reproductive imagination supplies 
us with associations such as those made between empirical causes and effects. We can 
reassert George’s example here of noticing that buds on trees bloom into flowers. This is 
an empirical association that presupposes the objective ground of the rule which is being 
applied. This rule grounding is accomplished by the productive imagination. The 
reproductive imagination associates appearances at the empirical level, while the 
productive imagination provides the ground for the rules of those associations (in this 
example, causation). So it is with the relation of transcendental memory to the schemata 
which are is products. Transcendental memory cannot be subject to time, for it is the very 
ground of the determination which generates time itself.
The exegesis of the schemata as products of a transcendental structure of memory 
showed the schemata to be temporal determinations which accomplished the generation 
of the past (time-series), the filling of the past with a content, or empirical memories 
(time-content), the ordering of this content within the past (time-order), and the duration 
of memories (scope of time). This last temporal determination, accomplished by the 
schema of modality, is not to be confused with the first two principles of the 
understanding which establish the necessity of duration for any possible experience. The 
schema is a temporal determination which establishes that appearances must be 
determined according to their duration in order to be subsumed under a concept. The first 
two principles of the understanding (axioms and intuitions) demonstrate how every actual 
experience is constituted by duration.
Experience, in its actuality, is always characterised by duration, instants which 
both constitutes and delimit duration, and a present which is determinately known by way
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of the past. These three universal characteristics of any possible experience are 
elaborated in the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, and the Analogies 
of Experience respectively. In the axioms we discovered that duration is a necessary 
aspect of our intuitions and that this presupposed the retentive power of memory in order 
to constitute an intuition which must necessarily endure through time, no matter the 
infinitesimal length of that duration. The anticipations of perception demonstrated the 
necessity of an intensive magnitude in sensations, such that moments, or instants, of 
temporal experience are relevant for us. The instants serve to delimit duration into, what 
comes to be known as, an event. It is, again, the retention of memory that allows for the 
implicit preservation of that instant which serves as the beginning point of an event, or 
duration, through time to that instant which delimits the event as completed (at least in 
our memory or knowledge of it). The analogies of experience serve to show how, once 
the possibility for duration and experiential events has been established, memory is at 
work in every actual experience itself. In the first analogy, Kant established that the 
experience of change requires an unchanging ground against which alteration can be 
known: substance. I followed Kant’s account with one of my own regarding the 
temporality of experience which demonstrated that, in so far as appearances are always 
temporally determined, changes in appearance through time, presuppose a temporal 
substance through which time can pass, but which does not itself pass in time. This 
ground of the passage in time is the past itself, as that permanence though which the 
passing of empirical instants, durations, and events becomes comprehensible as moving 
into a past. We cannot think of events as becoming past, no longer being present yet not 
completely absent from our consciousness, if the passage of time did not have a general, 
unchanging past against which to think this temporal alteration. Once again, we see the
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importance of the extra-temporality of transcendental memory as the ground for the 
schema of magnitude (time-generation), which in turn gives rise to restrictions of the 
conditions of sensibility of which the principles are the expression. It is because the 
transcendental structure of memory is the extra-temporal ground of the schema that 
conditions the principles governing experience that past events are comprehensible as 
past, and as mine. All of the principles of the understanding are possible in virtue of the 
temporal determination of appearances that ensures the applicability of the necessary 
structures of human consciousness to the world. This temporal determination is provided 
by the mediation of the schemata as conditions of sensibility that have the transcendental 
structure of memory (productive imagination) as their ground.
We can characterise Kant’s epistemological project in the Critique of Pure Reason 
as having three overarching levels of discussion: the structure of human consciousness, 
the applicability of these structures to the world (as appearance), and the resultant 
necessary characteristics of experience itself. I have argued here that the most important 
characteristic of the structure of human consciousness is, what I have termed, the 
transcendental structure of memory. This coincides with Kant’s own point that, for any 
knowledge to be possible, we must be able to attribute myriad experiences to the same 
self across time.
We have also seen, through a survey of some of the relevant secondary literature, 
that many of the difficulties in the field of Kant scholarship can be resolved through a 
charitable reading of Kant, and an understanding of the understressed role of memory in 
the structure of human consciousness and experience. Further, many of the difficulties 
encountered in the text dissolve if the importance of the role of memory is brought to the 
forefront of our reading of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is indeed a wonder that
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memory plays a negligible role in Kant’s explicit account of the possibility of human 
experience but, as I have hopefully demonstrated, the important role of this faculty of the 
human mind can be read into Kant’s account without doing any injustice to the text.
Our knowledge of the world, and of ourselves as meaningfully involved therein 
depends entirely upon our ability to self-ascribe events and experiences. This ability 
cannot be gleaned from a theoretically ‘raw’ experiential base, for there would be no 
anchor or reference point from which to begin such an epistemological project. There 
must be a structure of consciousness which makes the attribution of experiences to a self 
through time possible, and this structure is none other than that o f memory.
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